МИНИСТЕРСТВО ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ И НАУКИ РФ
Нижегородский государственный университет им. Н.И. Лобачевского

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СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ: ПРИКЛАДНОЙ АНАЛИЗ И ИССЛЕДОВАНИЕ
Учебно-методическое пособие
на английском языке

Рекомендовано методической комиссией факультета иностранных студентов для англоязычных иностранных студентов ННГУ, обучающихся по направлению подготовки — «международные отношения».

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2015
Настоящее пособие содержит англоязычные материалы по актуальным проблемам международных отношений и мировой политики. Предлагается адаптированный вариант курса “Международные отношения”, включающий в себя краткие конспекты лекций. Также излагается тематика практических занятий, и приводятся задания для самостоятельной работы и вопросы к экзамену.
Учебно-методическое пособие предназначено для англоговорящих иностранных студентов 3 курса, специализирующихся по направлению подготовки — «международные отношения».
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: APPLIED ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH

Studying methodological manual

This manual is recommended by Methodical Committee of the Department of Foreign Students for English-speaking students of Nizhny Novgorod State University studying at Bachelor's Program “International Relations”.

1-st edition

Nizhny Novgorod
2015
This manual contains materials in English on contemporary issues of international relations. The adapted variant of the course “Contemporary International Relations: applied analysis and research” is offered including lecture abstracts. Also the topics of practical classes are described; problems for independent work and examination questions are given.

The studying-methodological manual is recommended for English-speaking foreign students of the 3-d year specializing in Bachelor's Program «International Relations».
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Section I. Program of the course “Contemporary International relations: applied analysis and research”

Area of application
Level: 3d year BA students
Type: core course.
Duration: Two semesters, taught in 5th and 6th semesters.

Course description
This course gives students an introduction to the theoretical background to international relations and examines a range of contemporary and historical topics through which it is possible to explore the behaviour of states and international organizations.

Prerequisites for the course: Pre-Intermediate level of English (min.), good knowledge of general history and key modern political, social and economic issues.

Course overview
This course is designed to provide students with a broad introduction to the study of international politics, and will focus on significant themes and debates in the arena of contemporary international affairs. The course will introduce students to a variety of theoretical approaches to understanding these contemporary issues. It will also emphasize case-study analysis, both as a tool for applying the fruits of theory to the study of real-world events, and also as a tool for evaluating competing theoretical approaches. As so many of the topics studied in this course are the subject of ongoing debate (or even controversy) in both national and international arenas, the course relies on vigorous classroom discussion and active debate as a means of understanding and evaluating all sides of each issue.

Aims of the course
Set solid basis of understanding of main issues, developments and theories of Contemporary IR;
Equip students with theoretical research instruments;
Develop complex and interdisciplinary approach;
Develop presentation and analytical skills through presentation (oral and written).

**Course outcome**
Development of competences that students should be able to perform as a result of successful completion of the course:

**cultural**
- the ability to logically, reasonably and clearly present ideas in writing and in oral speech;
- the ability to adapt to the conditions of work as a part of a multi-ethnic and international groups;
- mastering methods of political communication in an international environment;

**professional**
- knowledge and understanding of Contemporary IR with regards to their historical, theoretical aspects;
- knowledge and active use of English language for conducting analytical research and professional communication;

**analytical**
- the ability to work with print sources of information, the materials of mass media, particularly the Internet resources,
- to prepare presentations on specific topics,
- to find, collect and summarize the factual material, making sound conclusions;
- formation of presentation skills for work with multinational audience.

**Teaching methodology**
The course will be taught with a combination of lectures and seminars. Lectures will cover the core of the course, exposing students to the main facts, concepts, interpretations and issues related to the IR. During seminars students will analyze and discuss key issues, answering questions and preparing short
presentations. The course is intended to use the interactive teaching methodology that implies active participation and involvement of students in both lectures and seminars. Lectures are given in a question-answer manner which leaves room for students’ active involvement. All students on the course are welcome to engage in discussion about the topic of the lecture and are expected to be ready for active discussions at seminars. All lectures are supported by visual materials (e.g., PowerPoint presentations).

**Course Requirements and Assessment criteria**

In this course, the students are required to attend classes (50 percent of the classes, at least), read the course materials regularly and participate in class discussions and give at least one presentation which should be turned in as an essay-type paper (2,000-word, excluding footnotes and bibliography) answering one question devoted to a particular topic.

**Total time consumption and types of work**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of work</th>
<th>Hours</th>
<th>Semester 5</th>
<th>Semester 6</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total time</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lectures</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seminars</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
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**Course content and structure**

**Chapter 1. Introduction.**

1.1. International relations and world politics as scientific disciplines.

**Chapter 2. Historical context of modern international relations system.**

2.1. Formation of the early IR systems.
2.2. The peace of Westphalia 1648. Sovereignty and state as basic concepts. Evolution or erosion of the Westphalian system of the world.
2.3. “Concert of Europe”. First collective security institution and its role.
2.4. League of Nations and Inter-war period. World wars and their results.
2.5. Cold War. Bipolar system of international relations. Cold war and its consequences.

**Chapter 3.** Theoretical ideas of political structure of the world.

3.1. Liberalism. Basic assumptions and its critique.
3.3. Realism. Key concepts and there application.
3.4. Neo-realism. Structural approach to world politics and main actors.
3.5. Critical Theory/Postmodernism. Postmodern approaches to international issues.

**Chapter 4.** Main actors in IR

4.3. United Nations (Intergovernmental organizations)

**Chapter 5.** Main tendencies of world development in the end of the XX-beginning of XXI centuries.

5.1. Globalization as the leading tendency of world development. Approaches to globalization, contradictions of globalization.
5.2. Integration. Regional economic integration is a key to prosperity and growth? Problem of Nationalism.
5.3. Clash of civilizations. New conflict lines on the global map. Conflicts in the contemporary world, mediation, conflict resolution, and conflict prevention.
5.5. Terrorism. New threats to stability and measures of counteraction. New technologies: their role in changing political structure of the world. Information, communication and biotechnologies.
5.8. Multipolarity. Unipolar or multipolar world? New world order and the future of international relations. New challenges to the modern world emerging from the formation of new political structure.

**Seminar topics**
1. History of the IR before the emergence of the system of national states.
2. Evolution or erosion of the Westphalian system of the world.
3. World wars and there results
4. Cold war and its consequences
5. Discussions on formation of new system of the international relations: multipolar or unipolar world.
6. Interstate interaction: foreign policy and national interest, new role of diplomacy.
7. New technologies: their role in changing political structure of the world. Information, communication and biotechnologies.
8. Positive and negative consequences of influence on political structure of the world, connected with introduction of new technologies.
10. Conflicts in the contemporary world, mediation, conflict resolution, and conflict prevention.
11. Problem of Nationalism.
12. “South-North” division of the world.
14. Human factor in international relations (demography, migration, education).
15. New challenges to the modern world emerging from the formation of new political structure.
16. Problem of interaction of the state and non-state actors in regulation of the modern international relations.
17. Growing influence of non-state actors in regulation of world affairs.
18. Russia in modern world political process.
Section II. Materials (lecture abstracts): main topics of the course
“International relations: applied analysis and research”

Chapter 1. Introduction.

1.1. International relations as scientific discipline.

Politics and International Relations is about the world in which we live collectively and the ways in which it became what it is today and continues to change. It considers the choices that political actors – from governments to citizens to international institutions – make and the structures and constraints under which they make them. It examines the ways that people conceive the world as they believe it might be and the realities with which they struggle in trying to make it so. It analyses the ways in which people have tried abstractly to make sense of the political and international worlds and the political contexts in which they have done so. World Politics aims to understand the political and international worlds as part of a single whole. It draws together analysis of contemporary politics and the historical development of political thinking.

International Relations is the study of relationships among states, the roles of sovereign states, inter-governmental organizations (IGO), international non-governmental organizations (INGO), non-governmental organizations (NGO), and multinational corporations (MNC). International relations is an academic and a public policy field, and so can be positive and normative, because it analyzes and formulates the foreign policy of a given State. As political activity, international relations dates from the time of the Greek historian Thucydides (ca. 460–395 BC), and, in the early 20th century, became a discrete academic field within political science. However, international relations is an interdisciplinary field of study.

Besides political science, the field of international relations draws intellectual materials from the fields: technology and engineering, economics, history, and international law, philosophy, geography, and social work, sociology, anthropology, and criminology, psychology and gender studies, cultural studies and culturology. The scope of international relations comprehends globalization,
state sovereignty, and international security, ecological sustainability, nuclear proliferation, and nationalism, economic development and global finance, terrorism and organized crime, human security, foreign interventionism, and human rights.

Chapter 2. Historical context of modern international relations system.

2.1. Formation of the IR system.

The history of international relations can be traced back to thousands of years ago; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, for example, consider the interaction of ancient Sumerian city-states, starting in 3,500 BC, as the first fully-fledged international system.

The centuries of roughly 1500 to 1789 saw the rise of the independent, sovereign states, the institutionalization of diplomacy and armies. The French Revolution added to this the new idea that not princes or an oligarchy, but the citizenry of a state, defined as the nation, should be defined as sovereign. Such a state in which the nation is sovereign would thence be termed a nation-state (as opposed to a monarchy, or a religious state). The term republic increasingly became its synonym. An alternative model of the nation-state was developed in reaction to the French republican concept by the Germans and others, who instead of giving the citizenry sovereignty, kept the princes and nobility, but defined nation-statehood in ethnic-linguistic terms, establishing the rarely if ever fulfilled ideal that all people speaking one language should belong to one state only. The same claim to sovereignty was made for both forms of nation-state. It is worth noting that in Europe today, few states conform to either definition of nation-state: many continue to have royal sovereigns, and hardly any are ethnically homogeneous.

The particular European system supposing the sovereign equality of states was exported to the Americas, Africa, and Asia via colonialism and the "standards of civilization". The contemporary international system was finally established through decolonization during the Cold War. However, this is somewhat over-
simplified. While the nation-state system is considered "modern", many states have not incorporated the system and are termed "pre-modern". Further, a handful of states have moved beyond insistence on full sovereignty, and can be considered "post-modern". The ability of contemporary IR discourse to explain the relations of these different types of states is disputed. "Levels of analysis" is a way of looking at the international system, which includes the individual level, the domestic state as a unit, the international level of transnational and intergovernmental affairs, and the global level.

2.2. The peace of Westphalia.

The history of international relations based on sovereign states is often traced back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 (a series of treaties Munster and Osnabruck which collectively ended hostilities in the Thirty Years War (1618-48)), a stepping stone in the development of the modern state system. Prior to this the European medieval organization of political authority was based on a vaguely hierarchical religious order. Contrary to popular belief, Westphalia still embodied layered systems of sovereignty, especially within the Holy Roman Empire. More than the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 is thought to reflect an emerging norm that sovereigns had no internal equals within a defined territory and no external superiors as the ultimate authority within the territory's sovereign borders.

Westphalia is commonly said to mark the beginning of the modern system of international relations. In relation to seventeenth-century Europe, it marked the culmination of the anti-hegemonic struggle against the Habsburg aspirations for a supranational empire. It signaled the collapse of Spanish power, the fragmentation of Germany (thus delaying German unity for over two hundred years) and the rise of France as the major European power. A number of important principles, which were subsequently to form the legal and political framework of modern inter-state relations, were established at Westphalia. It explicitly recognized a society of states based on the principle of territorial sovereignty; it established the independence of states and emphasized that each had rights which all others were bound to respect.
It recognized the legitimacy of all forms of government and established the notion of religious freedom and toleration. In sum, it established a secular concept of international relations replacing forever the medieval idea of a universal religious authority acting as final arbiter of Christendom. By destroying the notion of universalism, the 'Westphalia system' gave impetus to the notions of reason of state and balance of power as key concepts in foreign policy conduct and formulation. From 1648 onwards, the particularist interests of states became paramount both politically and legally. It should be noted, though, that the state-system established at Westphalia was primarily Christian and European. The codification of rules concerning non-intervention did not apply to Islam or to the rest of the world. This double standard persisted in European diplomacy into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when the Westphalia system gradually and often reluctantly became a global one. It is conventional wisdom in IR that the misnamed 'treaty' of Westphalia was an epoch-making single historic event that 'created' the modern system of sovereign states, each claiming exclusive control over a given territory. Recent scholarship has cast doubt on this view. According to Krasner (1993), the Westphalia settlement was in fact a very conservative arrangement which could be seen as a legitimization of the old Holy Roman imperial order rather than the precursor of the modern one. Sovereignty existed in practice long before the mid-seventeenth century and medieval practices continued long after. The term 'the Westphalian system' is thus a convenient shorthand for systemic changes which took place over a lengthy period of time.

2.3. “Concert of Europe”

In 1815 the Concert of Europe was created as a mechanism to enforce the decisions of the Congress of Vienna. It was composed of the Quadruple Alliance that had defeated Napoleon and ended his imperial adventures in Europe. The alliance consisted of four main great powers – Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Britain. In 1818 France was formally admitted to the club, but it had already played an important role in the settlements of 1815. The main priorities for the great powers of the era were to establish a stable balance of power in Europe to
preserve the territorial status quo, and to sustain ‘legitimate’ conservative governments in the heart of the European continent. Over the next 30 to 40 years the members of the Concert met regularly to consult and negotiate solutions to their disputes and to deal with broader threats to the Concert as a whole. As an exercise in sustained great power cooperation, the Concert was remarkably successful in its aims, at least until the middle of the nineteenth century. It managed to suppress revolutionary uprisings in Spain and Italy in 1820 and 1822, and to contain France from achieving supremacy in Europe. Ultimately, differences between the great powers of the era, and their joint failure to suppress forces of revolutionary change within their own borders, brought the Concert to an end. There are differences of opinion over when precisely the Concert ceased to function. Some scholars argue that the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853 signified its downfall. This was the first major armed conflict in Europe after the settlement at Vienna. Moreover, it represented an expansionist move against the weak Ottoman Empire by Russia that was contrary to the very purpose of the Concert. Others argue that despite periodic crises, the Concert managed to persist in a variety of forms until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, and after the members of the Concert had become rivals in two competing alliances. First, the Concert of Europe was composed of five roughly equal great powers. Second, the Concert of Europe was established in part to deal with a military and political threat in the heart of Europe. Third, all the members of the Concert of Europe shared certain conservative values. Despite their differences, which increased as the years went by, they accepted the system of the balance of power as the common framework of their endeavours.

2.4. League of Nations and Inter-war period.

The League of Nations was the predecessor to the United Nations. It represented a major attempt by the great powers after the First World War (1914–18) to institutionalize a system of collective security, and its founding Covenant was formulated as part of the Treaty of Versailles (1919). The first meeting was held in Geneva in 1920, with 42 states represented. Over the next 26 years, a total
of 63 states were represented at one time or another. To some extent, the League was an extension of liberal, parliamentary practice to international relations. It was based on the idea that political compromise arrived at by open discussion was the best means to promote political stability, an idea deeply held by one of the main architects of the League, US President Woodrow Wilson. Like so many international organizations, the League was also designed in light of the alleged lessons of the First World War. First, in 1914 Germany had crossed the border into France and Belgium. It was believed that in future wars it would be easy to decide who was the aggressor, a decision that was meant to trigger a range of collective countermeasures, ranging from diplomatic boycotts to the imposition of sanctions and ultimately war. Second, the system for the prevention of conflicts rested on the assumption that war could be prevented by the application of reason based on legal principles. The idea that power could be subordinated to law was a common assumption among many idealists of the interwar period. Third, the speed of political developments in 1914 led to the implementation of several mechanisms of delay to slow down unilateral decision-making in a crisis. Only after a period of three months subsequent to bringing a dispute to the Council was resort to war legal. It was assumed that such time limits would be respected. The failure of the League to deter or punish aggression by Italy, Japan, and ultimately Germany in the 1930s reflected some fundamental flaws in the design of the League. It should be noted that the League was never fully representative of the international community. The United States Senate did not ratify the treaties and did not become a member of the League. South Africa and Liberia were the only African states. The Soviet Union was not invited to Versailles, and did not join the League until 1934. Few South American states were represented, and only China, Japan, and Thailand represented Asia. Germany was missing from the start in light of its alleged responsibility for the First World War. Because the League was primarily a European body, the number of states that were able to carry out any police action against an aggressor was effectively limited to France and Britain. Without their consent, of course, no decision was likely to be carried out, and France in
particular was determined to use the League to contain Germany in Europe. The ultimate failure of the League to maintain international peace and security was a product of its limited membership, its preservation of a territorial settlement that humiliated Germany and its faith in the willingness of great powers to subordinate their short-term national interests to the preservation of international peace.

2.5. Cold War.

A period in international history (beginning soon after the end of the Second World War and ending in the early 1990s), as well as a description of the overall relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during that period. Although the cold war is fast fading into history, divergent interpretations of its character continue to shape expectations about some central features of contemporary international relations. For example, those who expect a world without extreme ideological conflict to be essentially harmonious tend to see the period of the cold war as inherently antagonistic. There are three main views about the cold war. Each of them generates a set of discrete claims about the causes of the cold war, the nature of the cold war, the end of the cold war, and its legacy in contemporary international relations. Perhaps the most popular view is that the cold war was an intense struggle for power between the superpowers. The word ‘war’ implies tension, armed conflict, and a zero-sum relationship between the superpowers. The word ‘cold’ refers to the presence of factors that allegedly restrained the confrontation and prevented a ‘hot’ war. Conventional historiography is based on a definition of the cold war that assumes a high level of East–West tension with the threat of escalation to nuclear conflict. Of course, there is a great deal of debate among those who share this overall view about who was to blame for the cold war. A common distinction is between orthodox and revisionist historians. According to the orthodox argument, the cold war was a struggle between conflicting universal values. In the West, the concepts of a market economy and a multi-party democracy were cherished. In the East, single party statism and a command administrative economy were highly valued. The obvious conflict of ideas and obstinate nature of those who defended them were the driving
forces behind the conflict. Within this broad school of thought, the behaviour of the Soviet Union during and after the Second World War was a crucial impetus to the cold war. The policies of containment followed by the United States were defensive reactions to an inherently aggressive and expansionist enemy. In the absence of nuclear weapons and the condition of mutually assured destruction (MAD), the cold war might well have turned ‘hot’ on a number of occasions. Fortunately, the Soviet Union was unable to sustain its competition with the United States, and this inability was the main reason for the collapse of the cold war system. None the less, the timing of that collapse was due in no small measure to the preparedness of the United States and its allies to match or exceed Soviet escalations of the arms race. Now that the cold war is over, the United States dominates the international system. In light of the benign nature of American hegemony, such dominance is not a matter of great concern. Revisionists agree with orthodox scholars about the nature of the cold war, but reverse the focus of blame. Revisionism became popular in the 1960s during the Vietnam War, but it remains a marginal school of thought within the United States. Revisionists emphasize the power of the United States during and after 1945. For example, although the United States lost 400,000 lives during the Second World War, the USSR lost 27 million lives. The American economy benefited from the war whilst the Soviet economy was almost destroyed. According to some revisionists, Soviet behaviour was merely a defensive attempt to build a legitimate security zone in Eastern Europe, whilst the United States was trying to reconstruct the international economic system for its own national interests. In short, the cold war was a period of American dominance whose legitimacy was based on a mythical Soviet ‘threat’.

**Chapter 3.** Theoretical ideas of political structure of the world.

3.1. Liberalism

The liberal tradition in international affairs can be traced back at least as far as John Locke (1632-1704) but it is in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that liberalism has had its most enduring impact. Indeed, the development of modern
international relations would be incomprehensible without an appreciation of the part played by the liberal approach. For example, the role of international organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations can be directly attributed to the liberal quest for the elimination of the international anarchy and the inauguration of the rule of law. It could be argued that the success of liberalism in the twentieth century is due to the influence in world politics of its most powerful proponent, the United States, but this would be to deny one of the basic tenets of its belief system — the idea that progress is inevitable and that the realist responses to the question of world order are atavistic and inherently dangerous.

The liberal theory of international relations contains a number of propositions, most of which derive from the domestic analogy concerning the relationship between individuals within the state. Among the most important are the following:

1. Peace can best be secured through the spread of democratic institutions on a world-wide basis. Governments, not people, cause wars. Democracy is the highest expression of the will of the people, therefore democracies are inherently more pacific than other political systems. An international system composed of democratic states would, in consequence, lead to a condition of perpetual peace, where conflict and war would disappear.

2. Bound up with this, and underpinning it, is a belief in the 'natural harmony of interests'. If people and states make rational calculations of their interests and act upon them, something akin to Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' would ensure that the national interest and the international interest would be one and the same. The free market and the perfectibility of human nature would encourage interdependence and demonstrate conclusively that 'war does not pay'.

3. If disputes continue to occur, these would be settled by established judicial procedures, since the rule of law is just as applicable to states as it is to individuals. An international legal regime based on common voluntary membership of international organizations would begin to fulfill the functions of a legislature, executive and judiciary, while still preserving the freedom and independence of the states.
4. Collective security would replace notions of self-help. The assumption here is that just as it must always be possible to identify an aggressor so also must it be possible to organize a preponderant collective coalition of law abiding states to oppose it. The League of Nations and the United Nations were founded on this premise; security being conceived of as a collective, communal responsibility rather than an individual one.

These are core beliefs of liberalism but liberals themselves often disagree as to the advisability of particular courses of action. In this context, it is instructive to distinguish between interventionist and non-interventionist liberals. The former, among whom Woodrow Wilson figures prominently, believe that although 'progress' is historically inevitable, it is sometimes necessary to help it along. Thus, war on behalf of the liberal ideal may occasionally be required to rid the world of illiberal and persistent opponents. The just war or the crusade are perfectly permissible policies provided the object is to further the cause of democratic liberalism. This attitude to war was put most succinctly by R. H. Tawney: 'Either war is a crusade, or it is a crime. There is no half-way house.' The non-interventionists, on the other hand, believe that a liberal world order is implicit in history and that the virtues of liberalism itself would spread without any active prodding by its adherents.

3.2. Neoliberalism.

Sometimes referred to as ‘neoliberal institutionalism’. This term distinguishes neoliberalism from earlier varieties of liberalism such as ‘commercial’ liberalism (theories which link free trade with peace), ‘republican’ liberalism (theories linking democracy and peace) and ‘sociological’ liberalism (theories of international integration). Neoliberalism which is inclusive of all the above is generally understood to be the most comprehensive theoretical challenge to the realist/neorealist orthodoxy in mainstream international theory. The principal charge levelled against political realism is its obsession with the war/peace, and military/diplomatic dimensions of international relations and its fixation on the nation-state as key actor. While not denying the anarchic character of the
international system, neoliberals argue that its importance and effect has been exaggerated and moreover that realists/neorealists underestimate the varieties of cooperative behaviour possible within such a decentralized system. Concentration on the security dilemma they argue, severely limits the scope and domain of international relations and renders it anachronistic as a model of global relations. Indeed, neoliberals define 'security' in much broader terms than neorealists: moving away from a geopolitical/military reading of the term, they emphasize wealth/welfare and environmental issues as equally valid considerations. Thus, they focus on institution-building, regime creation and the search for 'absolute' rather than 'relative' gains as mitigating strategies in a quasi-anarchic arena. Although nation-states continue to be important actors, they have declined in their ability to effect outcomes, particularly on the plethora of issues that transcend political boundaries Instead of a single agency, neoliberals favour a mixed-actor model which includes international organizations, transnational organizations, NGOs, MNCs and other non-state players. The dynamics of international relations arise from a multiple sources involving a mix of interactions not captured by the simplistic theories of realism/neorealism. Keohane and Nye (1977) refer to this process as complex interdependence and argue that the exclusiveness of neorealism fails to capture the complexities of international behaviour and in particular distorts reality by ignoring the institutions, processes, rules and norms that provide a measure of governance in a formally anarchic environment. In sum, neoliberals contend that the IR agenda has been greatly expanded in the twentieth century, particularly in the non-military wealth/welfare/environmental arenas. Therefore theories that concentrate on military/diplomatic issue areas are bound to be one-dimensional, since they are wedded to the past and incapable of dealing with systemic change.

3.3. Realism
Sometimes called the ‘power-politics’ school of thought, political realism in one form or another has dominated both academic thinking on international relations and the conceptions of policy-makers and diplomats, certainly since Machiavelli contemplated the subject. The ideas associated with it can be traced to the ancient Greeks and Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War is widely regarded as the first sustained attempt to explain the origins of international conflict in terms of the dynamics of power politics. Machiavelli in The Prince (1513) and Hobbes in Leviathan (1651) also provided crucial components of this tradition, especially in their conceptions of interest, prudence, and expediency as prime motivators in the essentially anarchic context of international relations. As a theory, or a set of propositions about the individual, the state, and the state-system, it reached the height of its appeal, especially in the Anglo-American world, in the years after 1940 when it appeared to explain the 'lessons' of appeasement and the inception of the Cold War era. Thereafter it was challenged on essentially methodological grounds by the behavioural or social science approaches but it reappeared in the 1980s in the guise of neorealism. Among its most prominent early adherents were: E. H. Carr, R. Neibuhr, J. Herz, H. J. Morgenthau, G. Schwarzenberger, M. Wight, N. Spykman and G. F. Kennan. Despite the basic weakness of some of their methodology, this group spawned a generation of distinguished scholars who continued the power-orientated approach of their predecessors. Among these were: R. Aron, H. Bull, H. Kissinger, R. E. Osgood, R. Rosecrance, K. W. Thompson, R. W. Tucker, K. N. Waltz and Arnold Wolfers. Without doubt, political realism is the most successful and perhaps the most compelling of the classical paradigms that shaped the development of the discipline. The tradition focuses on the nation-state as the principal actor in international relations and its central proposition is that since the purpose of statecraft is national survival in a hostile environment the acquisition of power is the proper, rational and inevitable goal of foreign policy. International politics, indeed, all politics, is thus defined as 'a struggle for power'. 'Power' in this sense is conceptualized as both a means and an end in itself, and although definitions are
notoriously loose and slippery its general meaning is the ability to influence or change the behaviour of others in a desired direction, or alternatively the ability to resist such influences one's own behaviour. In this sense a state's ability to act and react is a function of the power it possesses. The idea of self-help is central as is the notion of sovereignty. States answer to no higher authority and so must look to themselves to protect their interests and to ensure survival. The national interest therefore is defined in terms of power, to the virtual exclusion of other factors such as the promotion of ideological values or of moral principles. The nature of the anarchic state-system necessitates the acquisition of military capabilities sufficient at least to deter attack, and the best means of self-preservation is a constant awareness and reiteration of the worst-case scenario. Since all states seek to maximize power, the favoured technique for its management is balance of power. Stability and order are the result of skilful manipulations of flexible alliance systems: they do not stem from the authoritative force of international law or organization, which in any case is minimal.

3.4. Neorealism

Sometimes called 'new' or structural realism, this theoretical perspective is associated with the writings of K. N. Waltz, especially his influential Theory of International Politics (1979). While retaining many of the basic features of 'classical' realism e.g. states as key rational unitary actors and power as a central analytical concept, neorealism directs attention to the structural characteristics of an international system of states rather than to its component units. The concept of 'structure' here refers to the 'ordering' or the 'arrangement' of the parts of a system, and in Waltz's formulation it is the structural constraints of the global system itself, rather than the attributions of particular component units, that to a large extent explain state behaviour and affect international outcomes. By depicting an international political system as a whole, with structural and unit levels at once distinct and connected, neorealism establishes the autonomy of international politics and thus makes theory about it possible. Neorealism develops the concept of a system's structure which at once bounds the domain that students of
international politics deal with and enables them to see how the structure of the system, and variations in it, affect the interacting units and the outcome they produce. International structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them toward others. In other words, it is 'structure' that shapes and constrains the political relationships of the component units. The system is still anarchical, and the units are still deemed to be autonomous, but attention to the structural level of analysis enables a more dynamic and less restrictive picture of international political behaviour to emerge. Traditional realism, by concentrating on the units and their functional attributes, is unable to account for changes in behaviour or in the distribution of power which occur independently of fluctuations within the units themselves. Neorealism, on the other hand, explains how structures affect behaviour and outcomes regardless of characteristics attributed to power and status.

Waltz argued that the international system functions like a market which is 'interposed between the economic actors and the results they produce. It conditions their calculations, their behaviour and their interactions'. Not all neorealisists accept his image of the market as the primary force field of international relations, but all accept the basic propositions regarding the centrality of the state as rational, unitary actor and the importance of the distribution of power (e.g. overall systemic structure) in the analysis of inter-state behaviour, outcomes and decision-making perceptions. Waltz's reworking of political realism has attracted much critical attention, especially from neoliberals and, in a more dismissive fashion, from critical theorists and postmodernists, but few would deny that Theory of International Politics is the most sophisticated defence of realism and the theory of balance of power in contemporary international theory.

3.5 Critical Theory/Postmodernism

These terms are often used synonymously in IR literature. Though not altogether correct, this is understandable since many critical theorists are also postmodernists or as some prefer ‘late modernists’. The confusion is confounded by a fetish in contemporary theorizing for linguistic paradoxes, dialectics and niche
labelling as well as an inherent ambiguity in the terms themselves. There is clearly a sense in which all theory is ‘critical’ as well as a sense in which everything which succeeds ‘modern’ is, ipso facto, ‘postmodern’. A common distinguishing feature of both positions is that they represent a sustained challenge to existing theoretical traditions and moreover they reject IR as a discrete field of inquiry and seek to situate it in the wider intellectual context of social, political, cultural, philosophical and literary studies. Critical Theory (CT) is associated with a body of thought generally known as the Frankfurt School, and in particular with the work of the German social theorist, Jurgen Habermas. For Habermas, CT entails questioning the very epistemological (source of knowledge) and ontological (nature of being) foundations of an existing social order; the central claim being that all knowledge is historically and politically based. In IR this mode of analysis appeared in the 1980s as a reaction to the dominance of the neorealist/neoliberal orthodoxy. It claims that in spite of their differences and apparent opposition, both are premised on ‘the Enlightenment project’; that is a belief in the liberation of humanity through reason and the judicious application of scientific knowledge. This, in essence, is ‘modernity’. The ‘critique’ of modernity involves revealing its self-serving, particularist and privileged nature. The ‘crisis’ of modernity is that belief that the dominant trends of progressivist nineteenth- and twentieth- century political thought (in this case liberalism, Marxism and social democracy) has led not to emancipation and liberation as promised, but to new modes of enslavement and dehumanization, reaching its apogee in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia. The intellectual origins of these approaches are found in the works of Kant, Hegel, Marx and especially for the postmodernists, Friedrich Nietzsche, for whom the triumph of rationality portends disaster. The differences between critical theorists and postmodernists lie in their respective reactions to the supposed ‘failure’ of the Enlightenment project; the latter work towards its complete demise whilst the former strive for its deconstruction and eventual recasting. In IR both subscribe to the Marxist view that the basic task is not to interpret the world, but rather to change it. Thus both involve radical assaults on conventional theory which remains
stubbornly rooted in the ‘anarchy problematique’; neorealism seeking to work within its structural constraints and neoliberalism attempting to ameliorate its worst effects. The driving belief is that through the deconstruction of orthodox theory, ‘thinking spaces’ are opened up (thus circumventing discourse ‘closure’) and new possibilities for social and political transformations are made available. The belief that ‘theory is always for someone or something’ (i.e. that theories are always embedded in social and political life) is the starting point in the quest for emancipation and empowerment. In I R the villain of the piece is the Westphalian system and its privileging of the sovereign nation-state within a behavioral framework of an anarchical social order. Feminist and gender scholarship originates within this discourse and is a powerful exemplar of its central thesis since women in particular are ‘silenced’ or ‘excluded’ in the meta-text/narrative.

Chapter 4. Main actors in IR

4.1. The state

The nation-state is the dominant political entity of the modern world and as such can be considered to be the primary unit of international relations. However, it is a comparatively recent phenomenon. It developed in Europe between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire and the emergence of the centralized state claiming exclusive and monopolistic authority within a defined territorial area. Absolute political power within the community and independence outside it are characteristic features. With the emergence of a number of such political formations the modern framework of international relations began to take shape, that is, separate political units interacting within a context where no final arbiter or authority is recognized or indeed present. Historically, the fusion of 'nation' and 'state' post-dated the process of political centralization and it was the nineteenth century that witnessed the dovetailing of political organizations with a political social grouping which constituted the 'nation'. The people comprising the nation became the ultimate source of the state’s legitimacy and the national idea itself became the natural
repository of, and focus for, political loyalty. Thus, it was during this period that the coincidence of the boundaries of state jurisdiction and the characteristic elements that made up ‘nationhood’ took place. In the twentieth century this process became a universal one, though it should be noted that nations can exist without states and that states are not always composed of ethnically homogeneous social, cultural or linguistic groups. The nation-state, which is commonly regarded as the ‘ideal’ or ‘normal’ political unit, is in fact a particular form of territorial state — others are city-states and empires — and many commentators regard it as a disruptive force in the modern world. In particular, its obsessive emphasis on nationalism, on sovereignty and on raison d'etat has tended to militate against the development of a cohesive and pacific international community. The twentieth century has witnessed what appears to be a growing trend towards supranational forms of political organization, especially on a regional basis, yet the nation-state is still a potent force in international relations. However, its detractors have argued that although it may have been the most effective political formation in terms of providing economic well-being, physical security and national identity, there is no guarantee that this will continue. After all, the nation-state is an artificial, not a natural, construct and it may well be that despite its near-universality, it may already be something of an anachronism. However, some post-Cold War developments, especially secessionism and ethnic cleansing, may indicate a resurgence and malign refinement of the idea, as events in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia indicate.

4.2. Non-governmental organization (NGOs)

One of the most prominent features of contemporary international relations is the growth in the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Increased interconnectedness, partly associated with improvements in communications technology and transport, has given rise to literally thousands of specialized organizations, agencies, and groups. They are made up of private individuals, both paid and unpaid, and are committed to a vast range of issues, including protection of the environment, improving the level of basic needs in the Third World,
stopping human rights abuses, delivering food and medicine to warzones, advancing religious beliefs, and promoting the cause of women. What stands out about these organizations is that they establish intricate networks and links between individuals across the globe. Conventional wisdom is that these entities are peripheral to the study of international relations. It is hard to accept this view, however. Many NGOs are a force to be reckoned with. They have huge memberships, budgets, and the power to influence and shape government policy. Treating them as a marginal feature of international relations undermines the possibility of fully understanding their impact. Despite being a key concept in the lexicon of international relations, there is little scholarly agreement concerning the criteria for determining which organizations should be classed as NGOs and which should not. For some writers, any transnational organization that has not been established by a state is an NGO. Humanitarian and aid organizations, human rights groups, lobby groups, environmentalists, professional associations, new social movements, multinational corporations, terrorist and criminal organizations, and ethnic and religious groups all qualify as NGOs on this account. Others use the term to refer to a much narrower range of organizations. An NGO is any transnational actor that is not motivated by profit, does not advocate violence, accepts the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states, and works closely with the United Nations and its agencies. The term is limited mainly to humanitarian organizations. Thus it is a notoriously imprecise concept. One way of making sense of this terminological imprecision is to distinguish between the motives of different NGOs, particularly those that have universalist and non-partisan aspirations, and those that are motivated primarily by self-interest. The Red Cross, Amnesty International, the Salvation Army, OXFAM, Care, Greenpeace, and Médecins Sans Frontières fit into the former category. Their broad goal is the betterment of humanity as a whole. Multinational corporations and many private organizations fit into the latter group. A great deal has been written about the impact of NGOs on international relations. Three points are worth noting in this regard. First, while NGOs are autonomous actors, many work
closely with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that have been formed by states to advance their interests. Second, some scholars argue that NGOs have become such a significant part of the international landscape that a global civil society is emerging. As individuals interact at the international level, they become more cosmopolitan in their outlook and less attached to the sovereign state. Can we conclude from this that NGOs are eroding the power of the state? Not really. While there are literally thousands of NGOs operating around the world, globally speaking they represent a rather small number of individuals. If a nascent global civil society is occurring, it is one populated by elites and specialists. Third, the growth of NGOs highlights the growing significance of ‘people power’ in international relations. This has come about mainly because states have failed to respond to the immediate social, political, environmental, and health needs of individuals.

4.3. United Nations (UN)

In 1944, representatives of the great powers (the Soviet Union, the United States, China, and Britain) met at Dumbarton Oaks in the United States to draw up firm proposals for the new international organization, the successor to the League of Nations. In 1945, 51 states met at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco to debate the terms of the UN Charter. The UN has its headquarters in New York. Here it sets about achieving its three main purposes: to maintain international peace, to develop friendly relations among states, and to cooperate internationally in solving international economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The UN has six major organs. They are: the General Assembly; the Security Council; the UN Secretariat; the Economic and Social Council; the International Court of Justice; the Trusteeship Council. The only time that all member states meet together is in the General Assembly. Here representatives from each of the 187 states that make up the UN gather every year to discuss the world’s problems in a global parliamentary setting. The Assembly has little influence in world politics. It can debate any issue it chooses, adopt Resolutions with a two-thirds
majority, help elect members of other UN bodies, and vote on the UN budget. Ultimately, whatever power it has depends on its moral authority as a reflection of global opinion. The Security Council is the most important agency in the UN, particularly in fulfilling its primary purpose. It remains ready to meet at any time whenever there is a threat to international peace and security. There are 15 members of the Security Council. Five are permanent, and ten non-permanent members are elected for a period of two years from regional groups within the UN: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Western Europe, and Oceania. The P5 are the United States, Russia, China, France, and Britain. Decisions of the Council have to be accepted by a majority of members, and must include the P5, each of which is able to veto a decision. Without doubt, the General Assembly and the Security Council are the most important bodies in the UN.

The Charter of the UN is based on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. The UN is unable to respond effectively to armed conflict that blurs the line between civil and interstate war. Second, despite the end of the cold war, the UN is only as effective as its member states, particularly the P5, allow it to be. The UN lacks its own military forces, and therefore relies on member states to make forces available to the Secretary-General on request. It is slow to respond to crises, and cannot act in those areas that are regarded as legitimate spheres of influence by any of the P5, especially the United States, Russia, and China. Third, the UN is wholly funded by its member states, particularly the P5. This enables them to use their financial power to promote their own national interests at the UN. At the end of the twentieth century, there has been much discussion about how to reform the UN. Proposals have been put forward to make the organization more representative of the changing balance of power in world politics. For example, the P5 represent the victors of the Second World War rather than the most important states of the twenty-first century. Some commentators argue that Japan, Germany, and India deserve greater recognition and status in the Security Council. In addition, there has been much debate over whether and how to provide the UN with more financial and military power to
respond to crises deemed to be within its remit. Unless the United Nations is reformed, the gap between expectation and performance is unlikely to be closed. This would be unfortunate, since the United Nations remains the only international organization that approximates a form of global governance.

Chapter 5. Main tendencies of world development in the end of the XX-beginning of XXI centuries.

5.1. Globalization.

A term that refers to the acceleration and intensification of mechanisms, processes, and activities that are allegedly promoting global interdependence and perhaps, ultimately, global political and economic integration. It is, therefore, a revolutionary concept, involving the deterritorialisation of social, political, economic, and cultural life. It would be a mistake, however, to view globalization deterministically. Just as there are powerful forces of integration at work through the shrinkage of distance on a global scale, so there are forces of disintegration as well. Globalization has certain identifiable characteristics, although there is no consensus in the field. In the first place, it involves a growing consciousness of the world as a single place. This is reflected in phrases such as ‘the global village’ and ‘the global economy’. Few places are more than a day’s travel away and communication across territorial borders is now almost instantaneous. In 1980 there were about 1 million international travelers per day. In 2000 more than 3 million people crossed territorial borders as tourists each day. Second, new information and communications technology have improved access to overseas markets and streamlined both the production and distribution of goods and the trade in foreign exchange. Third, human beings are becoming more and more dependent upon one another as problems such as global warming, the international drugs trade, and terrorism can only be managed through greater cooperation at a supranational level. Fourth, some observers argue that globalization is erasing cultural differences. Sociologists, for example, like to talk about the Coca-Colaisation or McDonaldisation of global culture. Finally, some observers claim
that the sovereign state’s capacity for independent political action is weakened by globalization. This is especially true in the area of economic policy. The idea of a domestic economy hemmed in by well-defined borders and managed by the state is now obsolete. Today, domestic economic policy is subject to global market forces. The state has little effective influence or control over these forces. Any state that tries to exert its influence risks disinvestment, capital flight, and recession. In short, globalization involves a radical transformation of existing economic and political structures in international relations. There are many unresolved issues with respect to globalization. Among them is its relationship to democracy. If globalization is indeed weakening the ability of states to make autonomous economic and political decisions, then one might argue that globalization is a dangerously anti-democratic force.

5.2. Integration.

Integration is both a process and an end state. The aim of the end state sought when actors integrate is a political community. The process or processes include the means or instruments whereby that political community is achieved. There is an important proviso which must be entered immediately. The process of integration should be voluntary and consensual. Integration which proceeds by force and coercion is imperialism. Although historically empire-building has some of the characteristics currently attributed to integration, modern scholarship has been insistent that the process of integration should be regarded as non-coercive. Taking a historical perspective, the most significant attempts at building political communities in the past have been directed towards the creation of nationstates. Nationalist sentiments have often preferred to describe this as unification rather than integration. Current scholarship, with its emphasis on integration between state actors, can present a truncated view of the process if due regard is not paid to the nation-building purposes of earlier eras. An integrated political community must possess certain structural characteristics. Thus typically among states integration will produce a collective configuration of decision-making that will be closer to supranational ideal type rather than the international. For instance,
collective decisions might be taken by a majority of the membership and the strict unanimity principle would be abandoned. The need for policy integration will be particularly important if the nascent community is responsible for the allocation of goods and services between the constituent units. This will certainly be the case in those instances where political community building is predicted upon economic integration via customs unions and common markets. This aspect of community building has particularly exercised the interest and attention of students of integration in the post-1945 period. At a minimum, integration presupposes the existence of a security community, that is to say a system of relationships which has renounced force and coercion as means of settling differences. Beyond this requirement, economic interdependence will encourage the putative participants to engage in the kinds of collective action referred to above in order to promote mutual interests. Regionalism — expressed both in terms of similarity and proximity — will further enhance these tendencies. As integration precedes new tasks, responsibilities and mandates will be taken on by the central institutions. This 'organizational task expansion', as it has been called, will be positively correlated with the integration process. In an integrated community, political processes will take on characteristics often associated with intrastate, rather than interstate, politics. For instance, political parties and interest groups will start to press demands and articulate interests at the centre as well as at the periphery. Integration is a highly persuasive process in the contemporary world political system. As the number of actors involved in the European experiment has increased some observers have seen the dynamic being diluted. On the other hand the scope of integration - as measured by the number of sectors/issues involved in the integration process - has increased.

5.3. Clash of civilizations.

Concept associated in particular with the prominent American political scientist and foreign policy advisor, Samuel Huntington. In a highly controversial essay in the influential journal Foreign Affairs (1993) Huntington warned that the
end of the Cold War had created the conditions for the rise of a new and particularly dangerous form of international conflict — that associated with parochial and cultural identities based on ethnic and religious allegiances. He asserted that: It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. National states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. Although he identified a number of possible clash scenarios, he went on to assert that there is little doubt that ‘a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states.’ Huntington subsequently denied that his hypothesis was anything other than an alternative disciplinary paradigm for the study of world affairs but most commentators argue that his essay constituted a warning of the dangers posed by the politicization of Islam and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, to the Western attempt to establish an international order constituted by democratic states, liberal values and a belief in the free market. The coming challenge to the legitimacy of the dominant liberal international order has led some to characterize the conflict as one between ‘The West and The Rest’. Huntington’s thesis, notwithstanding its intrinsic contradictions and imprecision, sparked off a debate about the Islamic threat, in particular the perceived aim of establishing a ‘pax Islamica’ among the world's 1.1 billion Muslims. The Muslim world is centred on the Middle East and South East Asia (although Saudi Arabia is its spiritual home the most populous Muslim country is Indonesia), but there are large communities spread throughout Europe, Africa and Asia as well as sizeable segments in the Americas, China and India. Regarding geographical spread, Huntington identified an anti-Western front constituted by 'a crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to Central Asia'. This geopolitical fault-line between the Western and Islamic civilizations has generated conflict for at least 1,300 years, culminating in the
1990-91 Persian Gulf War, and the continuing violence between Muslims on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burnia and Catholics in the Philippines. He concludes grimly that ‘Islam has bloody borders’. Huntington has been accused by critics of exaggerating the Muslim threat, of misunderstanding the nature of political and fundamentalist Islam, of advocating the ‘re-ideologization’ of foreign policy and of encouraging the reassertion of the self-fulfilling prophecy syndrome in foreign affairs. However, given his position, as an eminent member of the US foreign policy establishment it is not surprising that the political geography of Islam is now receiving widespread attention by conservative sections of the strategic establishments in the West for whom the ‘Green Peril’ has now replaced the ‘Red Peril’ as the major obstacle to the globalization and good governance project.

5.4. Nuclear proliferation.

In May 1998, India and Pakistan engaged in a series of nuclear tests, raising the possibility of escalation in the pace of nuclear proliferation around the world. Nuclear proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons to states that did not possess them prior to 1968, when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed. Until the Indian and Pakistani nuclear detonations, international efforts to arrest the spread of nuclear arms in the 1990s seemed to be enjoying some success. The rate of nuclear proliferation appeared to be slowing down, the geographic scope of proliferation was shrinking, and de-nuclearisation was achieved in 1996 in parts of the former Soviet Union. Three post-Soviet states with nuclear weapons left on their territory – Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine – cooperated in the removal of those weapons to Russia and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states. Today, Russia is the only Soviet successor state with nuclear weapons. The indefinite extension of the NPT itself in May 1995 showed that the norm of non-proliferation had become more deeply entrenched in international affairs than ever before. At the same time, there exist powerful countervailing trends that could place recent non-proliferation achievements at risk and even threaten to rupture the painstakingly built non-
proliferation regime. Among these, the danger of loose nukes or weapons usable materials from the former Soviet Union is rightly regarded as the most serious cause of concern. Before the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a total of eight states possessed nuclear weapons. Five of these were formally declared nuclear weapons states according to the NPT: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China. In addition to India and Pakistan, it was also known that Israel had a covert nuclear weapons development programme. On the other hand, there were a large number of states that probably could have produced nuclear weapons but which had not done so. In the 1980s Argentina, Brazil, Romania, and Taiwan all took steps of one type or another to pursue nuclear arms but backed away or renounced their acquisition. South Africa – which had secretly acquired a six-weapon undeclared nuclear arsenal in the late 1970s – actually eliminated the weapons it possessed in 1991. In the years to come, it is unlikely that many states will join India and Pakistan in developing nuclear weapons. Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea remain states of significant proliferation concern. It is possible that Algeria also bears watching because of violent internal conflict and questionable nuclear technology cooperation with China. In addition, in late 1997 there were reports of Syrian efforts to acquire nuclear research installations from Russia. However, there have been continued efforts to improve verification procedures by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), although the failure of the United States Congress to ratify the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999 represents a significant step backwards in the evolution of a robust non-proliferation regime. There is some debate over how much we should be concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons. If mutually assured destruction (MAD) helped to keep the cold war cold, why shouldn’t other nuclear-armed states be deterred from going to war with one another? There are two problems with this view. First, it assumes that MAD did promote stability between the superpowers during the cold war, whereas it could be argued that there were plenty of other reasons why the superpowers did not go to war with each other. Second, there are technological problems of control.
Nuclear weapons in the United States and the former Soviet Union were equipped with elaborate devices to control access to the weapons. It is unclear if the same command-and-control procedures would apply in states such as North Korea, Iraq, and Syria.

5.5. Terrorism.

The unpredictable and premeditated use of violence or the threat of violence to achieve identifiable goals. It includes attacks against tourists, embassy staff, military personnel, aid workers, and employees of multinational corporations (MNCs). It can be used by individuals and groups against governments, and it can be used and sponsored by governments against particular groups. There are four relatively distinct kinds of terrorism. The first is transnational organised crime. Drug cartels may use terrorism to protect their private interests by attacking governments and individuals who attempt to reduce their activity and influence. The Italian Mafia, for example, has used terrorism to halt efforts on the part of the Italian government to curtail its criminal activities. The second type is state-sponsored terrorism. Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq are three of the major state sponsors of international terrorism to further their particular aims. State-sponsored terrorism is a method of warfare whereby a state uses agents or surrogates to create political and economic instability in another country. States also sponsor terrorism by giving logistical support, money, weapons and allied equipment, training, and safe passage to terrorists. The third major type of terrorism is nationalistic. Terrorism has often been used in the initial stages of anticolonial movements, or by groups wishing to secede from a particular state (examples include the Basque movement in Spain, Sikh nationalists in India, and a number of Palestinian movements). The fourth major type is ideological, in which terrorists use terror either to change a given domestic policy or to overthrow a particular government. The latter would include groups such as the Red Army Faction in Germany and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Thus terrorism is far from being a mindless, irrational force. Acts of terrorism are typically well planned and carried out with military precision. The terrorist’s greatest advantage is that he or she can easily
blend into a crowd. Over the last 30 years, the number of officially recorded terrorist incidents has increased markedly. Between 1968 and 1989, 35,150 acts of terrorism were recorded, an average of 1,600 per year. Between 1990 and 2010, the figure jumped to an average of 4,000 attacks per year. There are a number of specific reasons why terrorism can be expected to continue to grow. First, terrorism has proved very successful in attracting publicity, disrupting the activities of government and business, and causing significant death and destruction. Second, arms, explosives, supplies, financing, and secret communications technology are readily available. Some observers warn of new forms of terrorism in an age of globalisation. Sometimes referred to as postmodern terrorism, it would exploit information technology, use high-tech communications and computer equipment, and its targets would be data warehouses and computer network servers. Finally, an international support network of groups and states exists that greatly facilitates the undertaking of terrorist activities. In short, a world without some form of terrorism is highly unlikely and it is up to governments, individually and collectively, to seek ways to minimise the risk that it poses to their citizens.

5.6. Third World.

This term is used to refer to the economically underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America, considered as an entity with common characteristics, such as poverty, high birthrates, and economic dependence on the advanced countries. The First World is the developed world – US, Canada, Western Europe, Japan – and the newly industrialising countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), Australia and New Zealand. The Third World is the underdeveloped world – agrarian, rural, and poor. Many Third World countries have one or two developed cities, but the rest of the country is poor. Latin America, Africa, and most of Asia are still considered parts of the Third World. The term ‘Fourth World’ applies to some of the very poorest countries, especially in Africa, that have no industrialisation, are almost entirely agrarian (based on subsistence farming), and have little or no hope of industrialising and competing in the world market. The term ‘Third World’ is probably the one most
widely used in the media today. Of course, no term adequately describes all non-‘First World’, non-industrialised, non-‘Western’ countries accurately. In so far as one can make useful generalizations, the underdevelopment of the Third World is marked by a number of common traits: distorted and highly dependent economies devoted to producing primary products for the developed world and to providing markets for their finished goods; traditional, rural social structures; high population growth; and widespread poverty. Nevertheless, the Third World is sharply differentiated, for it includes countries at various levels of economic development. And despite the poverty of the countryside and the urban shanty-towns, the ruling elites of most Third World countries are wealthy.

No study of the Third World could hope to assess its future prospects without taking into account population growth. In 2000, the earth’s population was more than 6 billion, 80 per cent of whom lived in the Third World. This population growth will surely prevent any substantial improvements in living standards there as well as threaten people in stagnant economies with worsening poverty. Foreign aid, and indeed all the efforts of existing institutions and structures, have failed to solve the problem of underdevelopment. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), held in New Delhi in 1971, suggested that 1 per cent of the national income of industrialized countries should be devoted to aiding the Third World. That figure has never been reached, or even approximated. In 1972 the Santiago (Chile) UNCTAD set a goal of a 6 per cent economic growth rate in the 1970s for the underdeveloped countries. But this, too, was not achieved. The living conditions endured by the overwhelming majority of the people who inhabit the poor countries have either not noticeably changed since 1972 or have actually deteriorated. Whatever economic development has occurred in the Third World has not been distributed equally between countries or among population groups within them. Most of the countries that have managed to achieve substantial economic growth are those that produce oil: Algeria, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. They had the money to do so because after 1973 the Organization of Petroleum-
Exporting Countries (OPEC), a cartel, succeeded in raising the price of oil drastically. Other important raw materials are also produced by underdeveloped countries who have tried to form cartels similar in form to OPEC. All international agencies agree that drastic action is required to improve conditions in Third World countries, including investment in urban and rural public work projects to attack joblessness and underemployment, institutional reforms essential for the redistribution of economic power, agrarian reform, tax reform, and the reform of public funding. But in reality, political and social obstacles to reform are part of the very nature of the international order and of most Third World governments.

5.7. Democratisation.

The processes associated with the spread of democracy around the world from its core in Western Europe and North America. With the end of the cold war came a period of optimism concerning the prospects for democracy in the Third World. At the beginning of the twenty-first century much of that optimism has disappeared. Although many Third World countries have experienced the opening stages of a transition process to democracy, a large number of them remain stuck in the initial phases of the process. Although no comprehensive setback for democracy has taken place, there are no prospects for any substantial democratic progress either. It is important to distinguish between electoral democracy and liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is a system of government that meets the following conditions:

• meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organised groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force;
• a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major social group is excluded;
• a level of civil and political liberties – freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organisations – sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.
Over the past 30 years there has been some democratic progress. Democratic transitions began in Southern Europe in the 1970s; they came to include Latin America in the early 1980s and then Eastern Europe, Africa, as well as parts of Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There are more countries today than ever before with some measure of democracy and the ideological popularity of democracy has never been greater. Very few authoritarian rulers would actively defend traditional, authoritarian modes of rule (North Korea and Iraq are possible exceptions). In the large majority of cases, authoritarianism is justified with reference to its supposedly positive sides of creating, e.g. order, stability, growth, and welfare. Today, in many countries there is a real tension between attempts to promote democracy, and the increasingly global rather than local dynamics of capitalism. In many states, powerful middle classes have yet to develop, and it is unclear whether the European and North American experience can be duplicated on a global level.

5.8. Multipolarity

A type of system structure with at least three 'poles' or actors being identified as predominant. This domination is dependent upon the idea of capability or power potential as the essential defining possession of the ‘poles’. The actors that dominate a multipolar system need not be states; blocs or coalitions may qualify. Historically, the classic example of a multipolar system was the balance of power. As Walt has shown the act of balancing against a perceived threat in this type of system leads to the formation of alliances. Conversely if states do not balance against a threat, then they may bandwagon behind it. Waltz has argued that multipolarity increases uncertainties between the polar actors and therefore enhances instability. Polar actors may resolve this uncertainty by committing themselves to another party come what may — as Germany did to Austria-Hungary before 1914. Alternatively they may 'pass the buck' onto another party — as Britain and France attempted to embroil the Soviet Union against Germany before 1939. Since both these multipolar systems collapsed into systemic war, the empirical implication is clear-multipolarity is less stable. The end of the Cold War
era has provoked some analysts to dust off the multipolar model of international relations. Certainly in the sub-field of international political economy (IPE) multipolarity with admittedly a tripolar hue looks very plausible. The United States, Japan and the European Union being generally seen as the ‘poles’. In military security contexts the United States looks more dominant but seemingly lacks the will to prevail, preferring instead multilateralism which allows for ‘permissive enforcement’ on occasions such as the Persian Gulf War. The attitude of states that are ‘near-poles’ can be crucial. India’s position as a ‘near-polar’ actor in the Asia-Pacific region seems to have influenced its recent nuclear weapons assertiveness. The removal of the Soviet Union from the regional front rank has left India bereft to face a Sino — Pakistan special relationship that is perceived as threatening within the regional system. Mearsheimer (1990) famously speculated about a similar multipolar system emerging in Europe following the end of the Cold War era. Multipolarity is sometimes loosely used to characterize any system which is diffused and discontinuous. Whilst not exactly a debasement it certainly weakens the ties that bind this structural term to the idea of ‘poles’ that can be stipulated as the actors that give the system its character.
Section III Exam questions

1. Westphalian world and formation of system of the national states.
2. Results of Thirty years' war and conclusion of the Westphalian peace.
3. Main characteristics of the Westphalian model (system of the national states).
4. National sovereignty as basis of the Westphalian model of the world
5. Distribution of the Westphalian model throughout the world.
6. Concept of system of the international relations
7. Main features of various systems in the history of international relations ("The European concert", system of Versailles and Washington, system of Yalta and Potsdam)
8. Modern regional systems of the international relations
9. Ideas of Marx and Neomarxism in studying of the modern international relations.
10. Postmodernism in studying of political structure of the world.

Globalization of the modern world

12. Aspects of world globalization (economic, financial, ecological, etc.)
13. Russia in globalization.
14. World democratization as global tendency
15. Waves of Democratization
16. Concept of the democratic world
17. Integration processes in the modern world. Integration and cooperation.
18. Reasons for regionalization of the world
19. Role of regions in the modern world
20. Change of the security agenda in the modern world
21. International, regional and national security
22. Various aspects of security problems (military, economic, information, ‘hard” and “soft” security.)
23. Problems of military security and terrorism
24. Problem of arms reduction and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
25. Terrorism as a security problem
26. Economic factor in world politics and the international relations.
27. Role of Economic issues in the modern world.
28. Problem of creation of new global financial architecture
29. Legal measurement of the modern world
30. Problem of the national sovereignty
31. Territorial integrity and the rights of the nations on self-determination
32. Intergovernmental organizations and international regimes.
33. The UN and its role in the modern world. Discussions about UN reform
34. Regional international organizations
35. International regimes.
36. Role of Russia in the modern world
37. Integration and regionalization of the modern world

Section IV. References.
2. Brown C., Ainley K. Understanding International Relations - NY, 2005
Web sites
1) www.osce.org
2) http://www.un.org
3) http://europa.eu
4) http://www.nato.int
5) www.mid.ru
6) http://global.oup.com/uk/orc/politics/intro/baylis6e/ students’ online resource centre.
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