Мировые интеграционные процессы и международные организации: вопросы теории и прикладного анализа
Учебно-методическое пособие на английском языке

Рекомендовано методической комиссией института международных отношений и мировой политики для англоязычных иностранных студентов ННГУ, обучающихся по направлению подготовки — «международные отношения».

1-е издание

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Настоящее пособие содержит англоязычные материалы по актуальным проблемам глобальной интеграции и международных организаций. Предлагается адаптированный для студентов, обучающихся на английском языке, вариант курса “Мировые интеграционные процессы и международные организации: вопросы теории и прикладного анализа”, включающий в себя краткие конспекты лекций. Также излагается тематика практических занятий, приводятся задания для самостоятельной работы и вопросы к зачету.

Учебно-методическое пособие предназначено для англоговорящих иностранных студентов 3 курса, специализирующихся по направлению подготовки — «международные отношения». 

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WORLD INTEGRATION PROCESSES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THEORIES AND APPLIED ANALYSIS

Studying methodological manual

This manual is recommended by Methodical Committee of the Department of Foreign Students for English-speaking students of Nizhny Novgorod State University studying at Bachelor's Program “International Relations”.

1-st edition

Nizhny Novgorod
2021

Reviewer: Rogozhina E.M. associate professor NNLU

This manual contains materials in English on key issues of global integration and international institutions. Also the topics for practical classes are described; issues for independent work and examination questions are given.

The studying-methodological manual is recommended for English-speaking foreign students of the 3d year specializing at Bachelor's Program «International Relations».
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Section I. Introduction to the course “World integration processes and international organizations: theories and applied analysis”

(Program of the course)

1. Area of application. The course is designed for 3rd year BA students, specializing in “International relations” programme and is taught in 5th and 6th semesters. The aim of the course is to provide students with foundational knowledge and sound understanding of international organizations as actors on the world arena, to introduce students to key principles of their functioning, to provide students with acute insights into the working processes of different types of international institutions and integration processes.

2. Course outcomes

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<th>Competences</th>
<th>Results of education according to competences</th>
<th>Means of evaluation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PKR-7. Able to organize and conduct research work in the field of international relations</td>
<td>PKR-7.1. Possess a professional conceptual and terminological apparatus and use it in the course of analytical research on topical problems of modern international relations.</td>
<td>Tests, interviews, control work, presentations, participation in discussions</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKR-8. Able to understand the logic of global processes in their historical, economic and legal conditioning.</td>
<td>PKR-8.6 Understand the main trends in the development of international integration processes</td>
<td>Know key trends in the development of world political processes (globalization and localization, integration and disintegration, democratization, expansion of the circle of actors in international relations, problems of sovereignty, etc.). To be able to identify the prerequisites, factors for the development of integration processes, analyze their goals and objectives, classify international integration associations. Possess the skills to critically evaluate the activities of various actors in international relations</td>
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3. Structure and content of the course

3.1. Total time consumption and types of work

The scope of the course is 6 credit units (216 hours) - 3 credit units in each semester (108 hours). Intermediate assessment - credit with grades in 5 semester and exam for a course in 6 semester.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type of work</th>
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<td>Lectures</td>
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<td>Seminars</td>
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<td>Self-study</td>
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</table>
3.2. Course content and structure

Section 1. Main trends in world development: globalization and integration
Topic 1. The concept of globalization. Main features of globalization. Dimensions of globalization: as an objective trend in the modern world
Topic 2. Integration as a trend in world development. Characteristics of world political processes in the modern world. The future of the state.

Section 2. Theoretical foundations of the study of international organizations.
Topic 1. The concept of international organizations.
Topic 2. Classification of international organizations.
Topic 3. Formation of international organizations
Topic 4. Functions of international organizations in the international arena.

Section 3. International cooperation at the global level: The United Nations.
Topic 1. Features of the structure of the UN.
Topic 2 UN and international security.
Topic 3. The problem of UN reform.
Topic 4. The Bretton Woods economic institutions.

Section 4. The main forms of international cooperation at the regional and interregional levels.
Topic 1. Integration in Europe – The European Union.
Topic 2. Activities of key international organizations in Europe.
Topic 3. Main international organizations and integration processes in Asia and Africa.

Section 5 Russia and mail international organizations
Topic 1 Russia and the UN
Topic 2 Russia and the EU
Topic 3 Russian and post-soviet integration

Section 6. International non-governmental organizations in international relations.
Topic 1 Transnational corporations
Topic 2 NGOs and its role in modern world

4. Teaching methodology
The course will be taught with a combination of lectures and seminars. Lectures will cover the core of the course, exposing students to the main facts, concepts, interpretations and issues related to the global integration and international institutions. During seminars students will analyze and discuss key issues, answering questions and preparing short presentations. The course is intended to use the interactive teaching methodology that implies active participation and involvement of students in both lectures and seminars. Lectures are given in a question-answer manner which lives room for students’ active involvement. All students on the course are welcome to engage in discussion about the topic of the lecture and are expected to be ready for active discussions at seminars. All lectures are supported by visual materials (eg Power Point presentations).
Section II. Materials (key lecture abstracts)

Part 1. Main trends in the world development: globalization and integration

1. Main features of globalization

Since the integration of the Soviet bloc into the world economy after the Cold War, an important feature of global politics has been the process of globalization.

Globalization is a complex phenomenon. Globalization consists of processes that knit people everywhere together, thereby producing worldwide interdependence and featuring the rapid and large-scale movement of persons, things, and ideas across sovereign borders. It encompasses “the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual.” In a globalizing world, contacts among people and their ideas intensify and accelerate owing to advances in communication, travel, and commerce and produce mutual awareness and increased contact among individuals and societies. The rapid movement of large numbers of people results in cultural mixing and in the establishment of national diasporas far from home. Under these conditions, some observers believe, states enjoy ever less control of their destinies and are buffeted by forces outside their borders and beyond their sway. Sometimes globalization is closely connected to integration and understood as the increasing economic integration and interdependence of national, regional, and local economies across the world through an intensification of cross-border movement of goods, services, technologies and capital. Here we understand both terms as interconnected.

The best way to find out the meaning of the phenomena is to describe some of the most prominent attributes of globalization. Globalization’s key features include

- the spread of communication and information technologies,
- the declining importance of territory and the porosity of state boundaries,
- the spread of knowledge and skills and the participation explosion,
- the spread of capitalism and the emergence of global markets, the privatization of public functions,
- the spread of global culture and democratic aspirations, the emergence of global civil society,
- the diffusion of global power, the changing nature of security, the proliferation and deepening of nonstate identities and loyalties.

The spread of communication and information technologies

Globalization is built on the proliferation of powerful computers and microelectronic technologies that help individuals and groups to communicate virtually instantaneously by social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, email, and cellular and satellite telephones and to move vast amounts of money and information via these technologies. It also involves the spread of satellite technology for television and radio, as well as the global marketing of films and television programs. Overall, these technological revolutions overcome physical distance in politics, economics, and war.

The new technologies overcome geography and produce the rapid movement of persons, things, and ideas around the world.
The declining importance of territory

The declining role of geographic distance means that territory is less important than in past centuries. Some territories remain important, especially if they are sources of critical raw materials like oil, are important for symbolic reasons like the city of Jerusalem, or are strategically crucial like the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which much of the world’s oil passes from the Persian Gulf.

On the whole, however, geography is growing less crucial. Distance no longer poses a significant obstacle to important global economic, political, and military activities. Vast amounts of money can be moved around the world almost instantaneously, 24 hours a day, by electronic means. Individuals can conduct business globally from their own homes and send ideas and information back and forth via email and mobile phone regardless of distance. People living thousands of miles apart can be mobilized in cyberspace for political ends. Intercontinental missiles can deliver nuclear warheads in minutes, and terrorists can recruit members by posting videos and using social media.

The spread of knowledge and skills and the participation explosion

The spread of mass media and the communications and transportation revolutions enable more people, even in remote corners of the world, to be informed about the world, formulate opinions about events, and get involved in politics in ways that were previously unimaginable. Even isolated peasants have access to radios and, increasingly, mobile phones and Internet that provide information and that give both governments and anti-government groups new ways to persuade and inform publics. Cable and satellite television provide exposure to a vast variety of opinion and information. The Internet is the most important tool of all in facilitating exchange of views, dissemination of information, movement of money, and coordination of activities because it is relatively inexpensive and accessible. Blogs (short for weblogs) and bloggers influence people around the world by transmitting information and opinion on the Internet.

Access to information on the Internet was brought home by the publication by WikiLeaks, a group dedicated to airing classified information, in April 2010 of a video that showed a US helicopter in Baghdad killing a dozen Iraqis including two journalists. The Army Counterintelligence Center had previously declared that WikiLeaks “represents a potential force protection, counterintelligence, operational security (OPSEC) and information security (INFOSEC) threat to the US Army.”

Information and communication technologies like the Internet pose challenges to governments because they facilitate mobilization and coordination in cyberspace by professionals, insurgents, criminals, and terrorists. Groups not only use the Internet to express political and ideological positions but also to mobilize and coordinate activities, frequently against existing regimes. The Web is invaluable for mobilizing those with common aims who are geographically dispersed such as anti-globalization protesters against the WTO or activists lobbying for the Land Mines Treaty. Such groups can exist in cyberspace rather than on any particular national territory. Without the Internet, some could not exist at all. Thus, the Internet has facilitated new forms of expression and connectivity among groups and the growth of new public spaces not easily controlled by states.
The Internet is the most important technological innovation in the spread of globalization, especially in terms of overcoming geography and integrating individuals and groups in cyberspace. “It was,” argues economist Kenici Ohmae, “the development of the internet from the mid-1990s onward that has probably had the greatest impact on making the world of communications truly borderless.” The Internet enables global marketing, flexible production, electronic commerce, instantaneous financial flows that facilitate speculation and price volatility, the global propagation of ideas and opinions, coordination and mobilization of activities by corporations and other groups, and the global diffusion of news and information. Although an increasing flow in ideas and information may increase tolerance and individual abilities for some, the Internet can also be used to spread hatred between countries, races, or religions.

The technologies that play such a central role in globalization played a key role in globalizing the 2007–08 economic and financial crisis. The result was disastrous, as new financial instruments, unregulated by governments or international institutions, produced irresponsibility and speculation and, when financial meltdown began in the United States, integrated financial networks and institutions rapidly spread it around the world.

Capitalism and the emergence of a global market

After the Cold War, free-market capitalism as an economic ideology took root in much of the world, including Eastern Europe and the developing world. Its spread has been accompanied by an expansion of transnational corporations, the rapid movement of investments, the outsourcing of jobs and industries “off shore,” the proliferation of integrated global networks of production and distribution, the emergence of “world cities” such as New York, London, and Shanghai, and the emergence of an urbanized economic elite. Free-market capitalism is largely responsible for driving and sustaining economic globalization. Support for the global economic system by developing societies also depends in part on the system’s ability to reduce gaps between rich and poor and bring ever more people out of poverty.

Markets stretch beyond the boundaries of states and, as we shall see, makes it difficult for countries to control their domestic economies or protect themselves from the vagaries of global supply and demand or investment.

The privatization of public functions

One consequence of globalization is the need for states to compete in the global economy. Such competition encourages governments to privatize functions that they once performed in order to keep costs and taxes low. Countries like Greece and Spain are slashing expensive social-welfare programs, are selling off inefficient state-owned companies, and are sending citizens to the marketplace to find new suppliers for healthcare, pensions, and utilities. Privatization of costly state functions may continue if free-market capitalism continues to spread and if globalization deepens. Privatization, though, is not only visible in the economic realm; it is even a feature in military affairs. Although states have long relied on mercenaries to fight wars, in recent conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, they turned to private military firms to provide logistical support, training, security, and intelligence. Contractors like Halliburton and Blackwater augmented the US military presence in Iraq, performing tasks involving security and reconstruction in that country.
The spread of global culture

Globalization has been accompanied by the spread of culture, originally Western, featuring shared norms based on free-market or neoliberal capitalism, secularism, and consumerism. Increasingly, societies are adopting secular norms and acting according to the rules of free-market capitalism. Homogenization of mass culture can be seen in everything from dress, diet, and education to advertising and the spreading belief in women’s rights. Globalization ranges from Big Macs and designer jeans to abhorrence of torture and racism. “McDonald’s,” writes political scientist Benjamin Barber, “serves 20 million customers around the world every day, drawing more customers daily than there are people in Greece, Ireland, and Switzerland together.” Frequently, the spread of global culture is equated with Americanization or Westernization. Whether this is accurate, global culture does represent modernity to many people.

The emergence of global civil society

The emergence of global civil society has accompanied the spread of democracy. The proliferation and networking of intergovernmental (IGOs) and transnational nongovernment organizations (NGOs) have led some to suggest that a global civil society is beginning to coalesce. Such a society, according to advocates, promotes cooperative governance by institutions other than governments. Nongovernment organizations are the building blocks of civil society, whether domestic or global, occupying a social space that is independent of state control. One of the salient features of global politics in the twenty-first century is the proliferation of NGOs that link people transnationally in many realms of human activity. In 2014 4,560 NGOs enjoyed consultative status at the UN. Many of these play a growing role as sources of information, advocacy, and expertise and as lobbyists at UN-sponsored international conferences like the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing.

Among the earliest transnational NGOs was the Red Cross. It owes its birth to Henry Dunant, a Swiss businessman. Dunant, who was traveling in northern Italy in June 1859 hoping to meet French Emperor Napoleon III from whom he sought assistance for a business deal, came upon the village of Castiglione where thousands of wounded soldiers lay following the French victory over Austria in the Battle of Solferino. There, Dunant assisted women from the village who were trying to help the wounded. Deeply moved by his experience, Dunant later published a book in which he asked: “Would it not be possible, in time of peace and quiet, to form relief societies for the purpose of having care given to the wounded in wartime by zealous, devoted and thoroughly qualified volunteers?” Dunant’s question persuaded several influential Swiss reformers to establish an International Committee for Relief to the Wounded, which later changed its name to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the treatment of civilians and soldiers in wartime.

Equally important is NGOs’ growing role in creating norms that states feel obliged to follow. For this reason, NGOs figure importantly in constructivist ideas about norm evolution in global politics. Cooperating across national borders, NGOs have formed effective networks of experts and advocates, called epistemic communities. Such experts and advocates frequently meet with
one another at international conferences, and, as constructivists point out, the information and ideas they disseminate play an important role in changing norms that define states’ interests.

The idea of civic politics is that NGOs can contribute to global change and, with international organizations like the UN, as well as states, can contribute to the spread of global governance. “Global governance” and “global civil society” reflect the reality of authority at different levels and in different locations and suggest that “world order” exists at many levels not merely at that of sovereign states. Governance, as James Rosenau observes, “encompasses the activities of governments, but it also includes any actors who resort to command mechanisms to make demands, frame goals, issue directives, and pursue policies.” Thus, as noted earlier regarding international regimes, which consist of NGOs, IGOs, and states, liberals and English School theorists believe it is possible to manage political life even in the presence of “anarchy.”

**Diffusion of global power**

Following the Cold War, observers concluded that the world had entered a period of unipolarity, with the United States as undisputed top dog. Although the United States remains the world’s leading military power, countries such as China, Russia, and India are rapidly increasing their military and economic capabilities. America’s military superiority is no guarantee that it can realize its political objectives, as demonstrated in the limited success of US efforts to spread democracy, win the war in Afghanistan, and bring an end to global terrorism.

The relative US economic decline is linked to the country’s enormous current-accounts deficit and its emergence as the world’s leading debtor country and resulting dependence on foreign purchases of American securities. “How long,” asked President Obama’s former economic adviser, Lawrence Summers, “can the world’s biggest borrower remain the world’s biggest power?” Ultimately, this problem reflects overconsumption and inadequate saving by Americans and underconsumption and high saving rates in China.

It is difficult to say whether globalization is irreversible. Globalization optimists argue that the process is so far along that it can no longer be reversed, believe that it is no longer controlled by any single country or group of countries, and contend that the costs for countries to cut the web of interdependence in which they are enmeshed are simply too high for leaders to consider.

Pessimists believe that if the US is declining, globalization, too, will be reversed. Globalization owes much to American hegemony following World War Two and, even more, since the end of the Cold War. It also flows from the desire of US leaders to encourage and sustain an open trading system, global economic growth, and the spread of Western values such as individualism, democracy, free enterprise, and open borders. They point to Russian aggression in Ukraine, Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea and Sea of Japan, Iranian potential to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and the proliferation of failing states in the Middle East and elsewhere as evidence of global disorder, spreading sectarian and nationalist movements, and a return to a real-politik and nationalist world. Moreover, if America or its allies no longer support globalization either because they can no longer control the process or because their publics become disillusioned with elements of the liberal order like free trade or immigration it could undermine the public and private institutions that sustain it.

**The changing nature of security**
Although interstate warfare between conventional armies still erupts from time to time, a combination of factors is reducing its occurrence. These include the declining importance of territory, the difficulty in occupying other countries, growing economic interdependence, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the spread of civil war. Thus, the difference between legitimate war and crime is blurring, and violence among groups competing for power over the carcasses of failed states or over sources of wealth like diamonds, oil, and cocaine may increase. Terrorism, a weapon of the weak, persists, as dissatisfied individuals and extremists seek vengeance for real or imagined wrongs, endeavor to prevent the erosion of local cultures and traditional beliefs by globalization, or try to spread messianic ideologies.

The spread of WMD, especially nuclear weapons, also reflects a shift from conventional warfare. The West pursues an anti-proliferation policy, but its use of conventional force against countries such as Serbia and Iraq may provoke countries to acquire WMD to deter the United States and its partners. Although deterrence threats may prevent most countries from using WMD, they are unlikely to deter terrorist groups that acquire them.

The most important globalized threats to human survival are environmental challenges. Human welfare is challenged by global warming, deforestation, desertification, the loss of biodiversity, and other environmental trends. To date, global responses have been spotty at best, and vested economic interests have resisted concerted global responses. It is difficult for people to focus on these trends because many of them pose long-term rather than imminent hazards and solutions are expensive. As these threats impose growing economic burdens, however, markets may facilitate investments in responses such as renewable wind and solar energy. And science may provide answers to some of these problems. Finally, concerned individuals have mobilized their skills and influence transnationally and have established global networks to lobby and work for cooperative responses to environmental challenges.

Human rights abuses constitute another threat to human security, and some of the world’s most articulate NGOs are involved in securing human rights and publicizing such abuses. Human rights norms, like democratic norms, have spread globally. However, human rights abuses including genocide and ethnic cleansing by governments and other groups also remain widespread. Nevertheless, despite the continued reluctance of countries such as Zimbabwe and China to respect human rights, human rights norms are deepening and elicit widespread support, especially as more people become prosperous and as states and international organizations adopt new human rights conventions and set legal precedents that may gradually earn broad acceptance.

The growing importance of nonstate identities and loyalties

The growing separation of nationalism from citizenship, the degree to which technology has made it easier for ideas to be communicated and people mobilized at great distances, and the dehumanizing and homogenizing impact of the global economy and global culture are reviving and spreading nonstate identities associated with nation, religion, ethnicity, and civilization — all providing what geographer Doreen Massey calls a “global sense of place.”

Islamic militants oppose capitalism, socialism, and nationalism, all perceived as “failing ideologies of the post-colonial order.”50 Such militants, although opposed to globalization, have, according to two observers their own globalized vision, “an alternative form of globalization
from the currently dominant, and made to seem inevitable Western capitalist one.”51 They are advocates of neofundamentalism, “a closed, scripturalist and conservative view of Islam that rejects the nationalist and statist dimensions in favour of the ummah, the universal community of all Muslims, based on sharia (Islamic law)” who represent Muslims who are “uprooted, migrants and/or living in a minority” and are experiencing “the deterritorialization of Islam.” Notwithstanding the declaration of a new territorial caliphate by ISIS, Islam is not anchored in territory and has never accepted the division of the world into territorial states. “It is,” as one scholar suggests “embodied in people – mobile, deterritorialized people carrying ideas and practices,” and it “has been powerfully reshaped by globalization processes, particularly information and migration.”

As with many areas of global politics, theorists disagree about globalization. Some regard it as historically unprecedented, whereas others see it either as having deep historical roots or only marginally different than past eras.

2. Integration and the future of the state

As we noted earlier, the field of global politics, at least in the West, emerged as a state-centric discipline, and some scholars have been reluctant to admit that states may no longer dominate all of global politics, because without them, what was unique about international or interstate politics seems to vanish. Until recent decades, international relations scholars viewed relations among states as all that mattered. Most realists still conceive of sovereign states as unitary actors pursuing national interests in an anarchic world dominated by security dilemmas. The dominance of realism, especially among American scholars, kept the focus on unitary states competing for power, and the only (unlikely) alternative to sovereign states that most students were offered was world government or world empire.

Integration seems to provide a possible answer to the possible future of the state. Technology links people transnationally, making it virtually impossible to cage them or their ideas within state frontiers. These frontiers have become porous. Territory was the defining attribute of sovereign states and its declining significance in the face of technology is accompanied by a shift in people’s loyalties from a territorial home to non-territorial identities such as religion and ethnicity. The spread of knowledge and skills reduces the dependence of citizens on their governments and makes it easier for them to oppose their leaders. The spread of global culture undermines local cultures and traditions, while the emergence of global civil society has brought forth many nonstate actors that can compete with states for authority over citizens. The changing nature of global violence, notably irregular warfare and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, has reduced the capacity of states to protect citizens. New threats to security, such as environmental degradation and transnational crime, are global in scope and exceed the ability of individual states or groups of states to cope with them. Finally, the emergence of a global market forces states to compete and reduces states’ control of their economies.

The last of these claims has generated intense controversy, with some theorists claiming that the exigencies of competition have altered the essential nature of sovereign states. Political economist Philip Cerny vigorously argues this position, describing what he calls the “competition state: “The key to the new role of the state lies in the way that economic competition is changing in the world,” and “state structures today are being transformed into
more and more market-oriented and even market-based organizations themselves, fundamentally altering the way that public and private goods are provided.”

Others disagree. Some argue that governments do retain sufficient autonomy to determine the degree to which they intervene in domestic economic life, while others contend that states intentionally surrendered economic autonomy to rid themselves of burdensome obligations to citizens that they never wanted to assume in the first place. There are, after all, still differences in the level of welfare that European states provide citizens compared with the United States or China. Still, today’s trade is largely among transnational corporations or corporate subsidiaries, and markets stretch beyond the territory of national economic units in a globalized world. At present, the resources controlled by large corporations and banks, and of super-rich individuals like Bill Gates, Amancio Ortega, or Warren Buffett dwarf the resources of the governments of many states, and the wealth of large corporations like Apple or Walmart (as measured by sales or stock value) exceeds the gross domestic product of most sovereign states. And most states are losing or have lost at least some control over their own economies (e.g. members of the EU). Thus, countries like Greece, burdened by debt and buffeted by private market forces, have found themselves in a condition of economic and political near-collapse that makes a mockery of their sovereign status. Nevertheless, to a large extent, the discipline of economics still thinks of global economics as a world of trading nations that has changed little since Adam Smith. Although state sovereignty was never absolute and has been frequently violated, it should assure a state’s right to exist and its freedom from external intervention, but it often does not do so.

Many scholars still regard state sovereignty as the defining characteristic of global politics. Much of Western political philosophy focused on the state and its relationship to citizens, and the field of international relations was a logical extension that dealt with relations among states. In reality, from the outset sovereignty was always more an aspiration than a reality. For many rulers, sovereignty was a useful legal device that, as argued by realist Stephen Krasner, “was used to legitimate the right of the sovereign to collect taxes, and thereby strengthen the position of the state, and to deny such rights to the church, and thereby weaken the position of the papacy.”

Sovereignty is treated as a given by realists, the organizing principle of global politics that gives rise to anarchy. Liberals regard sovereignty as something to be overcome in the effort to achieve desirable goals such as safeguarding human rights, intervening in despotic states to spread democracy and end violence, spreading free trade, and enforcing global rules to end pernicious national environmental and labor practices. For constructivists, sovereignty is an institution that was “invented” by European political leaders as a necessary prerequisite for accumulating personal power and creating territorial states and that today serves as the chief norm that provides legitimacy for states. Sovereignty, as English School theorist Tim Dunne observes, is “the founding moment of politics” that “represents the fault-line between community and anarchy.”

Today, sovereignty tells us little about real states. The world’s sovereign states include a single superpower and some 29 “microstates,” with populations estimated as fewer than 500,000 people, ranging from Vatican City with 842 citizens to Brunei with 429,000 inhabitants. Many are tiny islands in the Caribbean and South Pacific. Consider the sovereign state of Tuvalu – a group of Pacific reef islands and atolls, with a population of 10,869, and an area of 9.5 square
miles. In 2000 Tuvalu sold the rights to the web domain “.tv” for $50 million in royalties for the next 12 years in a deal worth more than half its annual gross domestic product (earned from subsistence agriculture and fishing). By contrast, California with over 38.8 million inhabitants and a GDP of more than $1.9 trillion – more than Italy, Brazil, or Canada – is not sovereign and, despite having a budget deficit that reached $26 billion a few years ago, was not entitled to aid from the IMF or the World Bank.

Consider, too, the dramatic contrast between the prosperous and well-ordered city-state of Singapore and the state-like remains of Somalia, which became a failed state in the early 1990s, is divided among hostile clans and warlords, is the victim of violent terrorists, has witnessed repeated coups, and cannot suppress the pirates who raid shipping in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. In countries like Somalia, the idea of sovereignty is turned on its head; instead of providing citizens with security from foreign aggression by guarding the country’s borders, local militias are the source of insecurity for citizens who are desperate to flee violence by crossing those borders.

Often, sovereignty, which affords legal independence, is confused with genuine authority and autonomy. Sovereignty asserts that outsiders should not intervene in a state’s internal affairs and that citizens should respect its legitimacy and obey its laws, but there is no guarantee that they will follow these norms. All in all, in recent decades sovereign independence has offered only modest protection against military predation and boundary changes. In some cases, this amounts to what political scientist Robert Jackson calls “negative sovereignty,” that is, little more than protection for corrupt regimes in what he calls “quasi-states.” Thus, there is a growing gap between the promise of sovereignty and the reality of global politics. Indeed, many states are less autonomous and less able to protect or inspire citizens than at any time in recent centuries.

Nevertheless, realists and neorealists argue that little has changed and that state sovereignty remains almost as important today as it was during previous centuries. Krasner identifies four aspects of state sovereignty: domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty. Domestic sovereignty refers to the exercise of authority within a state; interdependence sovereignty involves control of movements across state boundaries; international legal sovereignty refers to a state’s recognition by other states as their legal equal; and Westphalian sovereignty denotes the exclusion of unwanted external interference within a state. Of these four dimension, Krasner argues, only the second, interdependence sovereignty, has significantly eroded. However, the four aspects of sovereignty are interrelated. Thus, if states cannot control movement across their borders (interdependence sovereignty), they are unlikely to enjoy domestic sovereignty or have the capacity to exclude foreign interference within their boundaries.

Sovereignty, notwithstanding, states have rarely enjoyed anything like complete control over subjects or their resources. Sovereignty has never prevented states from intervening in one another’s affairs. Neither France’s King Louis XIV nor Napoleon Bonaparte respected neighbors’ sovereign boundaries. In fact, the only European country that did not have its boundaries altered after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia was Portugal. And states’ use of violence in relations with one another has been a central subject of founding documents for the League of Nations and the United Nations, as well as both customary and positive laws of warfare like the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) that outlawed war. In regulating warfare, a distinction is made
between aggression and self-defense, and, countries routinely defend even acts of flagrant aggression against one another as “self-defense.”

In addition, recent decades have witnessed a growing gap between the capacity of states to act independently in global politics and to manage violence at home – the promise of sovereignty and the reality of global politics. In many states, citizens routinely flout the authority of their governments and actively participate in global politics directly through groups ranging from terrorist bands, giant corporations, and humanitarian organizations to street mobs and protest groups. Such activity is a far cry from the idea that citizens only participate in global politics indirectly by lobbying their governments and voting. “Today,” as political scientist Susan Strange argues, “it is much more doubtful that the state – or at least the majority of states – can still claim a degree of loyalty from the citizen greater than the loyalty given to family, to the firm, to the political party or even in some cases to the local football team.” No longer is citizenship always the principal identity of citizens, and governments must share citizens’ loyalties with other groups to an ever greater degree greater.

In Africa, the existence of some governments are extensions of tribal or clan power, governed by authorities unable to cope with explosive socioeconomic problems of poverty, population density, disease, and environmental catastrophe. Such weakness erodes loyalties to the state, while intensifying precolonial ethnic loyalties that postcolonial leaders sought to dampen. Ethnic conflicts in countries like Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo reflect what René Lemarchand calls the “manipulation of ethnic memory” by ambitious politicians who intentionally revive and simplify complex conflicts that may go back centuries. The South Sudan state is dead; the country is little more than an arena for conflict among warring factions. Some states and regions, like Somalia and Darfur in Sudan, have been sustained (barely) by humanitarian organizations and international agencies.

Nevertheless, the state is not vanishing, and the habit of patriotism is slow to die in many countries. But patriotism should not be confused with faith in government or politicians and, except for the burden of paying national taxes (if one does not evade them), patriotism tends to be a cheap sentiment, limited to flag waving and slogans like “Make America Great Again!”

One response to claims of state erosion might be that citizens are prepared to die for their country but not for international or nongovernmental organizations. Yet, it is hard to imagine citizens of modern states lining up as they did between 1914 and 1918 to join armies in battles that cost thousands of lives. Indeed, readiness to die for a cause is found more frequently among ethnic or religious minorities than among ordinary citizens in an average state.

State erosion is not universally recognized partly because of three paradoxes that Susan Strange describes. The first is that, while overall state capacity has declined, some governments do retain a major role in public education, policing, and health and welfare. Moreover, the intervention of government agencies in certain aspects of citizens’ lives has continued to increase. Government regulations create affirmative action quotas, establish high-occupancy traffic lanes, require automobile passengers to wear seat belts, and so on. Nevertheless, states are unable to protect citizens from environmental catastrophes, energy shortages, and economic cycles; and ordinary citizens today are becoming harder to persuade and satisfy.
Strange’s second paradox is that, notwithstanding the state’s “retreat,” there is a growing “queue” of subnational groups that want to have their own state. Die-hard realists seize on this apparent paradox to insist that, appearances to the contrary, nothing has really changed – the state is doing fine, thank you, since everyone seems to want one. A major reason more states exist today than during the Cold War, however, is that some states such as the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia have disintegrated and have spawned weak successors such as Bosnia or Georgia.

Strange’s third paradox is the apparent success of the Asian state model as reflected in strong states like Japan. The success of these states is due largely to special conditions that are ending and will not be repeated, mainly post-World War Two and Cold War development aid and technology from the United States. Economically, these states thrived because a strategic alliance existed between governments and private corporations and banks and because the US permitted them to pursue protectionist economic policies that shielded them from the worst effects of globalization. Asian governments today, however, face global pressures to adopt non-discriminatory trade and investment policies that could threaten their economic and political stability.

The Great Recession resuscitated the state to some extent. Regulation, especially of financial institutions, is looked upon with renewed favor, and preference for market-based solutions is no longer automatically assumed. French and German leaders, for instance, have called for such regulation, blaming the neoliberal policies of the “Anglo-Saxons” for the economic crisis. Governments responded with large-scale deficit spending that accounts for larger shares of GDP and the virtual, if temporary, takeover of major banks, financial firms, and private industrial giants. Government welfare and health programs are again in favor. Former French President Nicholas Sarkozy, having run for office as a free-marketer, famously concluded that the central consequence of the crisis is “the return of the state, the end of the ideology of public powerlessness.” State capitalism regained popularity, especially on account of China’s relative success in weathering the economic crisis. Growing state intervention was even evident in the United States, where President Barack Obama moved toward a more activist and bigger government, reflected in his health plan and in temporary government involvement in the operation of major banks and corporations like General Motors (though President Trump promised to reverse such policies in the US). Thus, state intervention in the developed world has grown – at least, temporarily – in an effort to ease the effects of recession.

**Conclusion**

Globalization, a central process in global politics since the Cold War, reflects both change and continuity. Recent years have been testing ones for globalization, and, even before the global economic crisis erupted and America’s relative decline, events and trends had challenged the globalization process. Among the most important were the collapse of the Doha Round of global trade negotiations, the proliferation of international trade disputes, the spread of global terrorism, the revival of nationalism, the growing complaints about the outsourcing of jobs from the developed world and resulting unemployment, growing resistance in the developed world to the flow of migrants and asylum seekers from poor countries, and the absence of agreement on controlling global warming. These events and trends, which constitute impediments to the free movement of persons, ideas, and things, suggested that the world was still divided into hostile
“tribes” and cultures rather than uniting within a single, homogenized culture of modernity. Integration as well as a co-product of globalization is experiencing both change and continuity.
Part 2 Theory and History of international organizations

1 Theoretical understanding of OI

The term international is often seen as a misnomer. Instead, it is claimed, the term ‘interstate’ or ‘intergovernmental’ should be used when describing an activity – war, diplomacy, relations of any kind – conducted between two sovereign states and their governmental representatives. Thus talk of an ‘international agreement’ between state A and state B to limit arms production or to control the selling of computer technology refers not to an understanding between the armament manufacturers of A and B or to a pact between their computer firms, but to an arrangement by state A’s governmental representatives with those of state B.

This state and government-oriented view of the word ‘international’ has been increasingly challenged over the past decades. It is no longer used synonymously with ‘intergovernmental’ to mean ‘interstate’ or relations between the official representatives of sovereign states. Instead the term has come to include activities between individuals and groups in one state and individuals and groups in another state, as well as intergovernmental relations. The first types of relationships – those not involving activities between governments only – are known as transnational relations. Connections between one branch of government in one state (say a defence ministry) and a branch of government in another country (its defence ministry or its secret service, for example), which do not go through the normal foreign policy-making channels, are called transgovernmental. All these relationships – intergovernmental, transnational and transgovernmental – are now usually included under the heading ‘international’.

The dual meaning of its singular form, and its interchanging in many books with the word ‘institutions’, confuses the use of the term ‘organizations’. International relations, whether between governments, groups or individuals, are not totally random and chaotic but are, for the main part, organized. One form of the organization of international relations can be seen in institutions.

Some writers confusingly refer to such international organizations as international institutions; reference is also often made to ‘the institutions’ of an organization, such as its assembly, council and secretarial. This use of ‘institutions’ to refer to the detailed structure of an international organization or as a synonym for international organizations is more restricted than the sociological meaning of the word.

What then are the irreducible essential characteristics of international organization and what are the other elements which often typify such organizations? The outstanding features have three headings: membership, aim and structure.

Membership. An international organization should draw its membership from two or more sovereign states, though membership need not be limited to states or official state representatives such as government ministers.

Aim. The organization is established with the aim of pursuing the common inter-ests of the members. It may end up not undertaking this task or favouring the interest of one member over
that of another, but it should not have the express aim of the pursuit of the interests of only one member, regardless of the desires of others.

Structure. The organization should have its own formal structure of a continuous nature established by an agreement such as a treaty or constituent document. The nature of the formal structure may vary from organization to organization, but it should be separate from the continued control of one member. It is this autonomous structure that differentiates a number of international organizations from a series of conferences or congresses.

So an international organization can be defined as a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and/or non-governmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership.

Other factors are often associated with most international organizations: their institutions usually consist of a plenary gathering of all the membership (often called an assembly or conference), a more regular meeting of a limited number of members, quite often with executive powers, and a permanent secretariat of an international nature. ‘International’ in this context can mean being drawn from several countries, or being chosen to serve the organization regardless of nationality, or being financed by the organization’s other institutions. Some organizations also have institutions with judicial or quasi-judicial powers. Here we adopt the proviso that the international organizations dealt with are to exclude those established with the purpose of making a profit for the members.

International organizations depend on member states for their creation, purposes, and survival. Realists repeatedly make this point, arguing that IGOs are the instruments of major states and can survive only so long as those states wish them to. By contrast, liberals believe that IGOs can become greater than the sum of their parts (members) and can behave independently of states. Constructivists look for evolutionary change in the organization of global politics based on gradual shifts in norms away from the narrow nationalism of the past toward greater concern with transnational issues that threaten human well-being. They argue that people are demanding creative solutions to problems that have defied states’ efforts and are contemplating new forms of collaboration that go beyond the narrow confines of state sovereignty. Constructivists conclude that IGOs could evolve from being the tools of states into more independent institutions provided that norms evolve in that direction.

We can imagine three types of IGOs. The first fit the realist model and do what their leading member states ask of them. The second, according to liberals, are organizations that can collaborate with states to achieve collective goals that would be difficult for states to coordinate on their own, like preventing the spread of disease. In the case of conflict, semi-autonomous IGOs might mediate or arbitrate disputes, suggest ways to reach agreement, provide forums for diplomats to meet, or separate adversaries, helping them end conflicts without “losing face.” The third are IGOs that have acquired genuine autonomy and pursue their own policies. As we shall see in the discussion that follows, IGOs can evolve from one to another of these and may exhibit features of all three at the same time.

We begin by considering the ideas of early liberal thinkers about the possibility for creating an IGO to keep peace and then examine two pioneering institutional experiments: the UN and the EU.
The desire for an international organization to keep the peace is associated with liberal thinkers. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed that international organizations could reduce interstate conflict. Like liberals generally, both extolled the power of rationality and thought that people would pursue their rational self-interest if they knew what it was. They assumed the perfectibility of people and states and the possibility that IGOs could overcome anarchy.

Kant, as we saw earlier, believed republics were a source of peace. Interstate relations, he thought, were analogous to those among individuals in an imaginary state of nature. States could escape anarchy by improving internally to make “perpetual peace” possible and by creating international law (which would encompass IGOs, today). Kant thus regarded IGOs as one of three related and reinforcing elements, along with democracy and economic interdependence, in establishing peace.

Rousseau’s analysis paralleled Kant’s, although he reached a somewhat different conclusion. Like Kant, Rousseau saw the condition of states as analogous to that of individuals in a state of nature. He too argued for the need to escape from the state of nature into civil society. But Rousseau proposed something closer to a world state that “must be strong and firm enough to make it impossible for any member to withdraw at his own pleasure the moment he conceives his private interest to clash with that of the whole body.”

International organizations have existed throughout history to mitigate conflict. Among the earliest, first recorded in 776 bc, was the Greek Olympic Games. Every four years, freeborn Greek males came from all over the Greek world to compete at the sanctuary of the god Zeus located at Olympia. Many athletes were soldiers who traveled directly from battle to the games. During the games, war among Greek city-states ceased, and soldiers laid down their arms for seven days before, during, and after the festival, because fighting was disrespectful to the gods. And the winners’ first obligation was to their gods, not their city-state.

Since then, other IGOs have encouraged interstate cooperation, and current scholarship finds that international organizations seem to contribute to peace, a finding to cheer liberals. One analysis identified six ways in which IGOs help maintain peace:

1. coercing aggressive states,
2. mediating among those in conflict,
3. providing information to reduce uncertainty and avoid misunderstanding,
4. solving problems in ways that help states see their interests in new ways,
5. promoting shared norms, and
6. “building a shared sense of values and identity among peoples.”

IGOs, it seems, were more beneficial before World War One and less so in the period between the two world wars, but have been an important force for peace in the years after 1945.

As noted earlier, a loose organization called the Concert of Europe was formed after Napoleon’s defeat in 1815. The Concert was not a full-fledged IGO but rather an informal mechanism for
consultation that helped states cooperate while retaining their autonomy, and it was not equipped to deal with the powerful forces that propelled Europe after the mid-nineteenth century. Other ancestors of modern IGOs were the 1899 and 1907 conferences convened in The Hague, the Netherlands. The first, sponsored by Russia’s tsar, drew representatives from 26 countries, and unsuccessfully tried to foster international disarmament, although it succeeded in banning aerial bombing, chemical warfare, and the use of hollow point (dumdum) bullets. It also established a Permanent Court of Arbitration, located in the Peace Palace in The Hague, to arbitrate disagreements among countries. The 1907 Hague Convention attracted 46 countries, and placed additional limits on warfare, including restrictions on submarines and armed merchant vessels.

These conferences were novel in that they aimed to remedy defects in the global system itself rather than resolve a particular war. Both led to agreements that provided important precedents for later changes in international law. The two Hague conventions, along with the Geneva Conventions, were expressions of the laws of war, and constructivists regard these precedents as important in changing our views of the need to manage violence.

The League of Nations was the first effort to establish a universal IGO to keep peace. The League was a bold but flawed experiment. For liberals, the idea of an international organization to keep the peace remained alive even during the dark days of World War Two, and under the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, US planning for the League’s successor began even while war still raged. Intensive planning among the allies climaxed at the UN Conference on International Organization in San Francisco in April 1945. Although those who attended the San Francisco meeting made some changes to earlier ideas in deference to small countries, the crux of the UN Charter was settled in bargaining among the Big Three (America, Britain, and the USSR).

2 League of Nations

During World War One, influential liberals in Britain, America, and France had called for a permanent international organization to maintain peace. The League Covenant was incorporated as the first 26 articles of the Versailles Treaty. It was originally the fourteenth of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and he fought doggedly for its inclusion in the peace treaty. The League Covenant described the organization’s major institutions and their responsibilities, as well as the rights and responsibilities of members. The Covenant established three permanent organs – the Assembly, the Council, and the Secretariat. It also linked the existing International Labor Organization and, in 1921, the Permanent Court of International Justice to the new organization.

The Assembly acted as a regular diplomatic conference in which members enjoyed a single vote regardless of size or power. In this sense, it reflected the principle of sovereign equality among states. The Assembly was empowered to deal “with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.” Like the Assembly, the League Council could deal with all matters affecting world peace, and neither body was superior to the other. Although provision was made for permanent as well as elected members on the Council, permanent members enjoyed no special status. Decisions of both the Assembly and the Council required unanimous votes, a provision which gave every member, large or small, a veto over League decisions. This rule reflected the powerful influence in global politics of sovereignty, equality,
and self-determination, but made it nearly impossible for the League to reach decisions on consequential issues. And, even League decisions were only recommendations.

The Covenant, like the later UN Charter, laid out a series of alternatives in the event of a threat to the peace. Among its options were arbitration, judicial settlement, and investigation. If the Council became involved it was obligated to investigate and issue a report. The Covenant then specified members’ collective obligations in the event war continued. An aggressor would “be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League” and be subject to “severance of all trade or financial relations” by other states. And, according to Article 16, if necessary, the Council could recommend the use of military force on the part of members to bring an end to aggression. In sum, aggression would be met by collective sanctions and, if needed, by collective force. Unlike Wilson’s original conception of collective security, however, the obligations outlined in the Covenant were voluntary and limited.

The United States never joined the League, and its absence, along with the absence of at least one other great power throughout the League’s history was a source of the League’s ineffectiveness. The USSR did not join the League until 1934 and was expelled in 1939; Germany joined in 1926 but left in 1933 when Hitler came to power; Japan left in 1933, and Italy in 1937.

America’s refusal to join the League illustrates the links between global and domestic politics. By the Constitution, the President may sign an international treaty on behalf of his country, but the Senate must ratify that treaty by a two-thirds majority. By 1919, the US was weary of war and overseas involvement and began to look inward. Also, many senators and Americans generally were wary of the implications for US sovereignty of the commitment under Article 10 of the Covenant to aid victims of aggression. Still, Wilson might have had his League had he been prepared to compromise with opponents, but he was not and instead chose to fight by taking his case to the country.

The fight over the League began after Wilson returned from Europe in February 1919. Senate opposition was led by Henry Cabot Lodge, who was the Republican majority leader and chairperson of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee. Lodge announced his opposition to the mutual guarantee contained in Article 10, but the debate was suspended by adjournment of the 65th Congress and Wilson’s return to Paris. The 66th Congress was deeply divided when it opened in May 1919. Those who supported US membership in the League were called internationalists. They were mainly Democrats. A plurality of senators, both Republicans and Democrats, took a middle position, seeking to add reservations to the treaty in order to safeguard American sovereignty. A small group of Republicans, including Lodge, demanded major changes in the treaty and were called “strong reservationists,” but only about 15 senators were genuine “irreconcilables.”

In the end, Wilson adamantly refused to compromise. The Versailles Treaty, including the League Covenant, was submitted to the Senate for ratification on July 10, 1919, setting the stage for one of the great dramas in US foreign policy history. Throughout the summer, Lodge conducted hearings on the treaty, and beginning in September Wilson set out on an 8,000-mile journey around the country, delivering 40 speeches in 22 cities in support of the League. On
September 25 in Pueblo, Colorado the president collapsed and was rushed home to Washington, where he suffered an incapacitating stroke.

A month later the Senate considered Lodge’s reservations to the treaty, which included exemption from the commitment under Article 10 to aid victims of aggression. What united the treaty’s opponents was their belief that only Congress could authorize the use of force by the US and could therefore override League decisions to use force. Despite British and French willingness to accept US reservations to the treaty, Wilson refused, and in May 1920 the Senate defeated the effort to ratify the Versailles Treaty and the League Covenant. The United States never joined the League and Congress turned down President Warren G. Harding’s compromise effort to join the World Court as a non-member of the League.

The 1920s were halcyon years for the League, because leaders and peoples vividly remembered the carnage of World War One, and the prospect of another war appalled them. In addition, it was an era of prosperity, and satisfaction with the status quo was high.

The League enjoyed several early successes. These included settling a Swedish–Finnish dispute over the Aaland Islands in the Baltic Sea (1920–21), preventing conflict over the boundaries of Albania (1921), dividing the region of Upper Silesia (1922), and avoiding a conflict between Greece and Bulgaria (1925). Despite these accomplishments, however, League weaknesses were already apparent. Thus, the League was unable to act when Poland seized Vilnius from Lithuania in 1920. And, when France occupied the industrial Ruhr in 1923 in order to force Germany to pay reparations it owed, Germans responded with passive resistance secretly financed by Germany’s government with money that it printed. The result was catastrophic inflation in Germany.

It became clear that the League was largely helpless in disputes involving major states. Thus, in 1923 the murder of an Italian diplomat in Greece led Italy’s Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini to bombard and then occupy the Greek island of Corfu. Instead of acting decisively, the League left the matter in the hands of a “conference of ambassadors,” and under British and French pressure, the Greeks actually had to pay Italy an indemnity before Italian troops would leave the island.

The moderate climate of the 1920s evaporated as political and economic conditions worsened in the 1930s. The Great Depression became worldwide in the early 1930s and with it spread a willingness to seek desperate solutions to economic woes. In this atmosphere, accumulated dissatisfaction led to authoritarian solutions in countries that had never accepted the outcome of World War One – fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany, and militarism in Japan. League paralysis ensued. Of 37 disputes between 1920 and 1937, only 14 were referred to the League, and only 6 of these were settled by League efforts. In the end, collective security was doomed by the policy of appeasement.
Part 3 Global governance

1 The United Nations as a leading global institution

The United Nations was to become a great experiment in cooperating to maintain peace and security. Its founders tried to avoid the League’s shortcomings, while pursuing similar goals. Over time, the UN has become a universal organization. Fifty-one states were Charter members, and membership later exploded, especially during decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s and, more recently, with the breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia. The UN has 193 members, the most recent of which were ontenegro (2006) and South Sudan (2011). The Holy See (The Vatican), Palestine, and the EU are not members, but maintain permanent UN representation.

The UN’s birth reflected recognition that a new international institution was needed to help states cooperate to attack the sources of war. In the words of Article 1 of the Charter, the UN’s purpose was to “maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.” During the Cold War, however, superpower deadlock spurred the UN to develop novel peacekeeping techniques. The end of the Cold War again altered the global landscape, as the United States and Russia began to cooperate on a number of issues. Although initial hopes were high, expectations about the UN and its future were tempered as the extent of post-Cold War problems became apparent.

The Charter’s framers sought to update the League Covenant. For example, the UN, more than the League, emphasizes global economic and social issues, reflecting a belief that one cause of conflict is poverty. To avoid the political divisions of 1919 that had prevented American entry in the League, US leaders adopted a policy of bipartisanship in which both Democrats and Republicans were widely consulted in planning the UN. Furthermore, the UN’s founding was kept separate from the peace settlement that ended World War Two.

Although an effort was made to present the UN as a new organization, some of its features were adopted from the League, and most of its organs had League parallels.

UN organs

The UN organs are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat, the International Court of Justice, and the Economic and Social Council. Despite differences in state power, the UN maintains the fiction of “sovereign equality” in the General Assembly, where all countries from America to Kiribati have a single vote. In ridding itself of the League requirement for unanimous voting, the UN made it easier to make decisions.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY The General Assembly has to approve the UN budget (Article 17) and receives regular reports from other UN organs, including the Security Council (Article 15). The Assembly can discuss any issue relating to maintaining peace (Article 12), but not if a matter is before the Security Council at the same time. General Assembly resolutions are not binding, and public debate in the Assembly often takes place only after member states have failed to resolve conflicts by quiet diplomacy. The purpose of such debate is less to solve problems than to publicize grievances, embarrass foes, and rally allies. Such debates make good theater but deepen disagreement and make it harder for participants to compromise.
In the UN’s early years, the General Assembly consisted mainly of America’s European and Latin American allies, and the organization as a whole served as a reliable tool of Western foreign policy. But as membership grew, the West found itself less able to command voting majorities in the Assembly, as these coalesced around the nonaligned less-developed countries (LDCs), which had interests in redistributing global wealth. During the last decades of the Cold War, the Soviet bloc and the LDCs found they both had interests in opposing the US, and, for that reason, Washington tended to ignore the Assembly.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council enjoys “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” and has authority to “investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute.” In contrast to the League Council, the Security Council does not have to wait for a dispute to be brought to it before it acts, and the UN’s founders believed that the Council would play a dominant role in keeping peace. Its key powers regarding peace and security are found in the Charter’s Chapters Six (“Pacific Settlement of Disputes”) and Seven (“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”). Unlike General Assembly resolutions, resolutions of the Security Council are legally binding.

The Charter permits the Security Council to order a spectrum of actions ranging from enquiry and mediation to “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication.” In recent years, the Council has imposed sanctions against countries such as Iraq, Serbia, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Iran and terrorist groups like the Taliban, ISIS, and Al Qaeda, but they are selectively imposed because they create hardships for innocent citizens and political complications for countries that enforce them. Finally, if sanctions prove inadequate, the Council “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

To this end, the Charter states that members “shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.” Only twice has the Council authorized force to enforce the peace: in 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea and in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait.

The structure of the League and UN councils also differs. Like the League Council, the Security Council has permanent and temporary members, but with a difference in voting. Under the Charter, the “P-5” (America, the USSR [now Russia], China, France, and Britain) were designated permanent members, and six (later ten) states were elected for two-year terms to rotate as non-permanent members – as Egypt, Japan, Senegal, Ukraine, and Uruguay were for 2016–17. Voting on most issues requires that majorities include all permanent members, giving each of the P-5 a veto (Article 27). The veto reflects recognition that the UN cannot run roughshod over great powers. Recalling League failures in the 1930s, the UN’s architects realized that pivotal states must be supportive for collective action to work.

An important precedent was set when the Soviet representative’s absence from the Council during a vote on the Korean War was counted as an abstention that implied neither consent nor disagreement. This interpretation allows permanent members to dissociate themselves from a Council resolution without being obstructionist and to show disapproval without alienating those
that support the resolution. During the era of US dominance in the UN, the USSR cast the most vetoes as a defense against US voting majorities in the Council, mainly to prevent admission of new pro-American members. Declining US influence in the UN led the US to cast its first veto in 1970. By 2008, the USSR/Russia had cast 124 vetoes, the US 82 (many of which blocked resolutions against Israel), Britain 32, France 18, and China 6.25 Between 2008 and October 2016, Russia vetoed nine resolutions and was joined by China on four occasions, and America vetoed a resolution (2011) condemning Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

THE SECRETARIAT The Secretariat is the UN executive organ. It is directed by a Secretary-General who manages the organization’s bureaucracy and finances and oversees the operation of all agencies and personnel, from technicians and policemen to doctors and soldiers. With operations in New York, Vienna, Geneva, and Nairobi, the Secretariat, as of mid-2010, employed over 41,000 international civil servants with an astonishing range of responsibilities. By Article 100, UN employees must not receive instructions from outside the organization, though this policy is often breached.

The criteria for employment (Article 101) are to be “the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity.” These criteria are difficult to meet, however, owing the requirement that employees be hired from all geographic regions, some of which have few trained personnel. On the plus side, the UN has been a “school” for civil servants from LDCs, many of whom return home to serve their countries. On the down side, it has also meant that, while most of its employees are dedicated and honest, the UN has also been plagued by some incompetent officials who rarely return home and enjoy sinecures in New York, Geneva, Nairobi, or Vienna.

The Secretary-General, who is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council, is the world’s leading civil servant. The UN has had only nine secretaries-general, the most recent being António Guterres of Portugal (2017–21), who replaced South Korea’s Ban Ki-moon after two terms (2007–16). In large measure, their personalities and skills determine their effectiveness. Thus, Sweden’s Dag Hammarskjold (1953–61) was an activist, Austria’s Kurt Waldheim (1971–81) and Peru’s Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1982–92) were allegedly anti-Western, and Egypt’s Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992–96) was a spokesperson for the interests of LDCs.

The Secretary-General’s position is demanding because he or she must navigate between the conflicting interests of member states. The safest path is to do only what powerful states wish, as did the League’s Secretaries-General between 1919 and 1933. But that is also a formula for institutional failure. Like the UN itself, the Secretary-General must walk a fine line between following the wishes of powerful members and taking initiatives to meet UN responsibilities. This is especially difficult when major states are divided and when the Secretary-General’s actions are scrutinized for any trace of partiality. Boutros-Ghali was viewed by the Clinton administration as unwilling to reform the UN, and, consequently, America prevented his re-election to a second term. By contrast, Kofi Annan was able to maintain the confidence of most members, despite criticizing US intervention in Iraq in 2003.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE The International Court of Justice (ICJ), made up of 15 justices who reflect geographic and political diversity, is the successor to the League’s Permanent Court. The ICJ can decide cases brought to it (“contentious cases”) or provide
advisory opinions when asked to do so. Few states have accepted the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, and most have decided, case by case, whether to allow the ICJ to render a binding decision.

The ICJ is valuable when the parties to a dispute want to resolve their differences, as did Singapore and Malaysia in 2003 when they found themselves in a territorial dispute over two small islands. However, it is rarely useful in highly politicized cases. For example, in an advisory opinion to the General Assembly during its 2003–04 session, the ICJ stirred up a hornet’s nest by ruling that the “security fence” constructed by Israel for protection against terrorist attacks was illegal because it involved annexing Palestinian territory and violated the human rights of about 56,000 Palestinians by enclosing them in enclaves cut off from the rest of the West Bank. Israel refused to accept the ICJ’s decision, invoking its right of self-defense, and both Israel and America denied the ICJ’s jurisdiction in the matter.

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL AND THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES Unlike the League, the UN’s founders recognized that conflict arises from many sources including poverty, hunger, and ignorance. To confront these issues, they established the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with the task of reporting on global “economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters” about which it may make recommendations, and incorporated a group of specialized agencies that are responsible for particular functional tasks.

Chapter 9, Article 55 of the Charter reads:

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;

b. … solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and

c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

As part of this effort, the UN feeds 90 million people in 80 countries. It vaccinates 58 percent of the world’s children and aids 55 million refugees.

ECOSOC is a large institution that accounts for the highest proportion of the UN’s budget and employees, and it consults with many of the 4,189 nongovernmental groups that were registered with it in September 2014.30 ECOSOC also oversees the specialized agencies whose tasks range from improving food security (Food and Agriculture Organization) and promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy (International Atomic Energy Agency) to promoting cooperation in telecommunications (International Telecommunication Union). The most important of these are the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Several specialized agencies predate the UN. Thus, the Universal Postal Union was established in 1874; the International Labor Organization is the only surviving major institution established
by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles; and the World Health Organization is a successor to the League’s Health Organization. The nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth witnessed the emergence of other “specialized agencies” intended to meet people’s needs for economic and social welfare. Among these were the Central Rhine Commission (1804) and the European Commission for the Control of the Danube (1856) to facilitate navigation. Such organizations were based on functionalism, or the idea that states were economically and socially interdependent and that if they overcame economic and social problems the probability of war would be reduced.

Functionalists theorized that creating organizations to respond to socioeconomic problems would be like casting stones into a pond, each producing ever widening ripples into new issue-areas. Success would bring greater success, and additional institutions would be built to meet other human needs. Global efforts to address one demand (like monitoring disease) would produce new demands (like reducing carbon emissions). Functionalists believed that states would more readily surrender non-political technical and economic responsibilities than core sovereign responsibilities like military security. Such steps, they thought, would gradually erode state sovereignty until there emerged a complex network of international agencies to perform states’ welfare functions. Convinced of the possibility of change in global politics, functionalists were optimists with much in common with contemporary neoliberals, especially their high hopes for the role of IGOs in improving the prospects for peace.

In practice, functional institutions like the UN’s specialized agencies have done little to limit state sovereignty. And, although such organizations facilitate interstate cooperation, the tasks they perform are rarely non-political because they redistribute funding and welfare in ways that produce “winners” and “losers.” For example, in the 1980s America, Britain and Singapore withdrew from UNESCO, a specialized agency intended to foster education and preservation of global cultural monuments, claiming it sought to limit press reporting in the developing world. Britain rejoined in 1997, the US in 2003, and Singapore in 2007 after UNESCO implemented structural and policy reforms.

In addition to its attention to economic and social issues, the UN has been constantly involved in trying to prevent wars or end them once they have begun. The next section examines the evolution of these efforts and their relative success.

The UN and the maintenance of peace

Although the UN record is mixed, it has enjoyed more success in maintaining peace than did the League. It has used many mechanisms in this effort, including nonbinding resolutions, fact-finding missions, observers, economic and military sanctions, peacekeeping forces, and, on a few occasions, military force.

UN missions are approved by the Security Council and planned by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Since 1948, there have been 71 missions, mainly since 1988 of which 16 remain at present. The first – the Special Committee on the Balkans (1947–52) – consisted of 36 observers who were sent to confirm that Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were complying with recommendations during Greece’s communist-led civil war. The largest mission to date was the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (1992–95) in Bosnia, which at top strength numbered almost 40,000 military and over 5,000 civilian personnel. The smallest
consisted of only two representatives of the Secretary-General who were sent to observe events in the Dominican Republic following US intervention in that country in 1965.

As of May 2016, 123 countries were providing peacekeeping 121,000 peacekeepers in missions around the world involving military and civilian personnel at a cost of $8.27 billion, the largest of which is the African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) which began in 2007 and currently consists of 20,513 uniformed personnel (troops, military observers, and police) plus an additional 3,412 civilians. Some of these missions are very dangerous. Almost 2,500 UN peacekeepers were killed between 1948 and 2008, and in 2003, 22 UN employees, including UN envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello, were victims of a suicide bombing in Iraq. In 2009 and early 2010, 218 additional peacekeepers died, mainly as a result of the earthquake in Haiti, attacks in Darfur, and an assault on UN staff at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

MAINTAINING PEACE DURING THE COLD WAR The UN’s founders hoped that the victorious World War Two allies would continue cooperating to maintain peace. Yet even as the UN was being established, Cold War clouds were gathering, and, with both superpowers having a veto, the Security Council was paralyzed almost from the outset. Owing to differences between the superpowers, peace enforcement was impossible, and any effort to mobilize the UN against either would result in the institution’s collapse. The Council came to resemble a debating club and, for many of the great events of the Cold War, it had to sit on the sidelines.

The Charter did not originally foresee peacekeeping. Chapter Six dealt with peaceful settlement of disputes, assuming that if conflicts could be postponed and the parties made to discuss their differences, wars triggered by national pride, ignorance, or emotion could be prevented. However, the techniques of peaceful settlement — “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means” (Article 33)

– are useful only if adversaries want to avoid conflict. They are ineffective when hostility is deep-seated and adversaries are willing to go to war to achieve their ends.

Unlike Chapter Six, Chapter Seven sought to deal with overt aggression by means of peace enforcement. As initially conceived, the Security Council was to have primary responsibility in enforcing peace. Articles 39–42 of Chapter Seven empower the Council to require member states to take whatever action, including force, is needed to maintain or restore peace. Articles 43 and 45 sought to give the Council “teeth” by calling for agreements to provide the UN with a permanent military force that has never been established.

Under these circumstances, the UN role in maintaining peace evolved, shifting authority from the Council to the Assembly where, in the 1950s, America enjoyed paramount influence. Following China’s intervention in Korea, the General Assembly acted to circumvent the veto in the Security Council by adopting the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which permits the Assembly to meet in emergency session if the Council is deadlocked. The Assembly could then recommend “collective measures in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression.”

Although the Security Council remained deadlocked, the UN developed an innovative process to allow it to act in cases in which the superpowers were not directly involved. A technique was needed that was more robust than Chapter Six but less provocative than Chapter Seven.
Peacekeeping, drawing on elements from both, was this technique, a sort of “Chapter Six-and-a Half.”

During the 1950s and 1960s, the Arab–Israeli conflict and postcolonial conflicts in Africa and Asia threatened to entangle the superpowers. Concern that Soviet or US involvement in local wars might lead to superpower confrontation convinced Secretary-General Hammarskjold that the UN had to act to prevent this. “Preventive action,” he declared, “must, in the first place, aim at filling the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major parties, the initiative from which might be taken for preventive purposes but might in turn lead to a counter action from the other side.”

The first explicit peacekeeping mission took place in 1956 following the Anglo-French–Israeli effort to seize the Suez Canal. A UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was sent to the Sinai Desert to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces. UNEF helped both sides to “save face” by creating a buffer zone between them. Egypt demanded that UNEF leave just before the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War, but peacekeepers (UNEF II) returned after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, remaining until the 1979 Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty was concluded.

Following UNEF, peacekeeping became popular. Between 1960 and 1963, the Operation in the Congo (ONUC) oversaw the withdrawal of Belgian colonial forces, tried to maintain law and order, and maintained the independence and territorial integrity of the new country. The Congo operation was so complex that it almost proved too much for the UN. It illustrated how dangerous it was for the UN to get involved in civil wars and how difficult it was to remain impartial in such conflicts.

Another major mission began in Cyprus in 1964, where the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was sent to prevent a resumption of fighting between the island’s Greek and Turkish communities. Consisting of military contingents and civilian police, the mission successfully interposed itself between the two communities. However, overcoming the underlying division proved elusive, and in 1974 Turkish forces invaded the island to protect the Turkish minority. After five decades since the mission began, UNFICYP remains in Cyprus as evidence that the presence of a peacekeeping force but does not solve underlying political differences between adversaries.

During the Cold War, peacekeeping missions involved fact-finding, monitoring of borders, verification of agreements, supervision of disarmament, demobilization of enemy forces, and maintenance of security in elections. However, as long as the Cold War persisted, operations remained limited in scope and objective. Key features of successful peacekeeping during the Cold War included:

- Adversaries must be states, not parties to a civil war.
- The physical line separating adversaries must be clear.
- Both sides in a conflict must consent to a UN presence, and UN forces should remain only so long as both wish them to.
- UN forces must be impartial, and personnel must be drawn from countries that are not deeply involved in the Cold War.
■ The use of force should be minimal, and UN soldiers should be only lightly armed for self-defense.

■ Missions should have a narrow mandate to prevent confrontations while foes seek solutions.

Peacekeeping was never intended to solve highly contentious issues. Instead, it was to facilitate a solution by delaying or limiting violence, thereby creating an atmosphere conducive to negotiation. Some have argued that peacekeeping sometimes had a negative result: allowing disagreements to fester so that they became more difficult to resolve. The Cold War’s end, however, seemed to offer the possibility for more vigorous UN action in the service of peace.

**MAINTAINING PEACE AFTER THE COLD WAR** The end of US–Russian hostility seemed to herald the dawn of a new era in UN peace enforcement. Following Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the superpowers agreed to invoke peace enforcement for the first time since the Korean War. In ensuing years, the UN embarked on a series of ambitious, complex, and controversial missions involving humanitarian intervention and state building that stretched its capabilities and ignored features of earlier peacekeeping such as gaining the approval of warring parties in advance and not using soldiers from the superpowers.

The most formidable challenge facing the UN today is civil strife and the collapse of central authority in LDCs, especially in Africa and the Middle East. Domestic conflict has been accompanied by the rise of warlords, rogue militias, and terrorist groups that engage in ruthless savagery against civilian populations. Humanitarian concerns and the need to restore order have led the UN to authorize intervention in the domestic affairs of such states despite the norm of sovereignty and with varying success to reconstruct state institutions. Thus, even though it was authorized, NATO’s overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011 angered Russia because Moscow believed that the UN had not meant to permit “regime change.” Thereafter, Libya became a failed state, and Russia resisted international intervention in conflicts like Syria’s civil war. Post-Cold War conflicts feature several traits that distinguish them from those of first-generation peacekeeping:

■ No clear line separates foes, which are not just states, but rebel groups, warlords, and ethnic communities engaged in unconventional warfare.

■ Peacekeepers find it difficult to be impartial; they may identify aggressors and lay blame, particularly for gross human rights violations like ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

■ Frequently, parties do not consent to a UN presence because they have something to gain from conflict or view the UN as their adversary.

■ Peacekeepers are more heavily armed because missions are more dangerous.

■ Missions have broad mandates to solve conflicts by rebuilding governing institutions, ensuring respect for human rights, and delivering humanitarian aid.

In 1991, the small Asian country of Cambodia became a testing ground for humanitarian intervention. Cambodia was a victim of the Vietnam War and, after falling under the rule of the communist Khmer Rouge, had experienced a genocidal campaign at the hands of its own leaders,
during which some 1.7 million Cambodians died. After the regime was ousted after Vietnamese intervention in 1978, low-level violence continued between remnants of the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnam-supported government. In 1991, when the parties agreed to end the conflict, political authority in Cambodia was divided between the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and a council of Cambodians from the country’s various political factions. UNTAC oversaw preparations for elections and began efforts to rebuild the shattered country until its mission ended in 1993. At its peak, the UN contingent consisted of 15,991 troops and more than 50,000 Cambodians to organize elections.

Among the most complex post-Cold War UN operations was UNPROFOR, which operated in the former Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995. UNPROFOR originated as a temporary effort to protect areas in Croatia in the midst of Yugoslavia’s collapse. When the conflict expanded into a civil war in Bosnia among Serbs, Croatians, and Muslims, UNPROFOR imposed a no-fly zone in Bosnia. It also tried to assure the delivery of supplies to Sarajevo, which was under siege and artillery bombardment by Bosnian Serb forces in the surrounding hills. From the Serb perspective, UN efforts to protect Bosnian Muslims meant that the UNPROFOR was taking sides and was another enemy.

Such UN operations were larger and more complex than those during the Cold War, and it is unlikely that such operations can be sustained in future without large-scale involvement of major states. Thus, the Bosnian conflict was brought to an end only after NATO intervention. Even where major powers are not directly involved, the UN has to rely on them for logistics, transport, and funding. The demands placed on UN personnel are so extensive that they threaten to overwhelm the organization’s capacity. Whole armies and large-scale contingents of administrators, not small contingents of peacekeepers, are needed where governments have collapsed, violence is endemic, and refugees number in the millions. Thus, growing burdens and the reluctance of leading members to provide necessary resources threaten the UN’s continued effectiveness as an agent of peace and security. UN burdens are growing rapidly at a time when the United States is hesitant to entrust its interests to the organization. In the next section, we examine some of the challenges confronting the UN.

**The UN and the future**

Financing the United Nations is a major challenge for the organization. The UN depends on members for funding. They are assessed on the basis of their capacity to pay as determined by national income, and the scale is regularly reviewed. Until recently, the maximum percentage paid by any single member was set at 25 percent, an amount paid only by the United States. However, under US pressure this ceiling was reduced to 22 percent in 2000. At present, Japan is assessed at 12.53 percent, China 7.92, and Germany 6.39. Many member states pay the minimum of 0.01 percent. Assessments pay for the organization’s regular budget. UN peacekeeping is also funded by a system of assessments. Overall expenditures by the UN and its agencies in 2013 were $32.4 billion, a decline from the previous year. Yet, in 2014 member states owed the UN $3.5 billion, and in 2015 only two members of the Security Council – France and New Zealand – paid their assessed dues on time.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the USSR was the UN’s leading deadbeat, but in recent decades the United States has had this dubious distinction even though it costs only 0.1 percent of the US
budget. By the late 1990s, US disenchantment with the cost of UN operations, concern for US sovereignty, and American propensity to act outside the UN framework created a financial crisis for the organization. One way the UN has tried to cope with financial difficulties is through agreements with corporations for joint development projects. In an unprecedented act of philanthropy, in September 1997 CNN founder Ted Turner announced he would donate $1 billion in the following decade and in 2000 he added another $34 million to cover America’s unmet obligation.

The debate over UN financing was symptomatic of larger issues concerning America’s role in the world and UN’s relevance. Is it in the interest of the world’s superpower to limit its capacity to act as it wishes, or is the legitimacy conferred by acting within the constraints of the UN important enough to justify those constraints? These questions were sharply posed in the 2002–03 debate in the UN Security Council over whether to invade Iraq. Many of America’s friends believed that in invading Iraq, the US was overreacting. Thus, despite Britain’s “special relationship” with the US and its role in America’s “coalition of the willing” that invaded Iraq in 2003, in 2006 two-thirds of Britons said their opinion of the US had worsened in recent years. This led a prominent British political scientist to declare, “there has probably never been a time when America was held in such low esteem on this side of the Atlantic.”

When small countries behave unilaterally, it is one thing; but when the United States does, it is another. If the UN’s most powerful member acts without regard to the organization, the UN is likely to become more and more irrelevant, as did the League of Nations. American willingness to act without UN approval was not new. Washington paid little attention to the United Nations during the Vietnam War, and in 1999 neither the US nor its NATO allies obtained UN approval for intervention in Kosovo. Unilateralism is not a US monopoly. It was mirrored by Iranian and North Korean intransigence about developing nuclear weapons (in both cases condemned in Security Council resolutions), China’s refusal to loosen its hold on Tibet, Israeli unilateralism in occupied Palestine, and Russian policy in Chechnya.

In recent years, revelations about UN inefficiency and, in some cases, corruption has produced calls for reforming the organization. The UN’s reputation was tarnished by accusations of corruption in Kosovo and in the Iraq oil-for-food program, and allegations of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers persist. The organization has also been accused of firing those who reveal misconduct. However, there is little agreement about what type of reform is needed.

In November 2003, Kofi Annan set up a “high-level panel of eminent personalities” to look into the possibility of UN reform. Among the ideas considered was changing Security Council membership. The “G-4 proposal” called for adding four non-permanent members and six permanent members, including Germany, Japan, Brazil, India, plus two African countries. The “African Union proposal” was to add five new non-permanent seats and six new permanent seats (two for Africa, two for Asia, one for Latin America, and one for Western Europe). The “Uniting for Consensus Proposal” involved adding ten new non-permanent seats chosen by regional groups. Although the P-5 would retain their preeminence, major countries such as Japan, Germany, and India would enjoy greater status. The suggested changes in Council membership have been controversial and are unlikely to be adopted.
Significant divisions also exist regarding the veto power of permanent members of the Security Council. Some countries oppose the veto but believe, if it is retained, it should extend to new permanent members of the Council. Others argue that new permanent members should not be given the veto. Finally, some countries seek to abolish it.

Significant reform of the Security Council will be difficult, as the organization retains a power structure that reflects the balance of power following World War Two. Major structural changes, such as enlarging the Council and reallocating veto power, require the support of two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of all UN members, including the P-5. Thus, the very structure that was intended to ensure that the major powers remained engaged in the UN now serves as an obstacle to keeping the organization relevant in a changing global system.

The 2003 panel also identified six challenges facing the UN in coming years: interstate conflict, internal violence, social and economic threats, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and crime. With these threats in mind, the panel also considered greater scope for UN humanitarian intervention and the preventive use of force but only after a “serious and sober assessment” of the threat by the Security Council. In addition, the Secretary-General proposed that the UN pressure rich countries to contribute 0.7 percent of the gross national income as foreign aid and codify rules on using military force as recommended by his panel.

The six challenges require a stronger UN than presently exists. For instance, problems of internal violence, social malaise, economic decline, terrorism, and crime produce state fragility and failure. As these proliferate, pressure will grow for the UN to intervene in situations that are so desperate that the organization will literally have to manage those countries. Running a country, however, is not an easy job as the UN discovered in Kosovo where efforts to hold local elections and foster local control faced virulent Serb opposition and efforts to limit local control enflamed Albanian nationalism.

In sum, none of the roles available to IGOs described at the beginning of this lecture alone can do justice to the UN. On the one hand, dominant states prevent the UN from pursuing the genuinely independent role advocated by liberals. On the other, the UN is more than an instrument of major states, as realists claim. Instead, as constructivists expect, norms are evolving such that the UN may play a greater role in maintaining peace than in the past. Whether this will happen or whether the UN will suffer the same fate as the League of Nations remains to be seen.

2 The Bretton Woods institutions

The first steps in building a new economic order were taken at the July 1944 UN Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. At Bretton Woods, the representatives of governments agreed to establish the IMF to help states with short-term balance-of-payments problems and the World Bank to provide long-term capital for poor states. This arrangement represented a compromise between the ideas of British economist John Maynard Keynes, who led his country’s delegation to Bretton Woods, and Harry Dexter White, the chief international economist at the US Treasury. Keynes sought a powerful independent institution to balance American economic power, whereas White sought an organization that would be an adjunct to US economic power.
The conference also encouraged tariff reduction to stimulate world trade, and the 1947 Havana Conference adopted the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the charter for a proposed International Trade Organization (ITO). Fearing that the ITO would undermine US sovereignty, however, Congress refused to approve its establishment. The GATT remained as an international forum to promote tariff reduction and resolve trade disputes. Its key norm was the most-favored-nation (MFN) rule that requires countries to treat one another equally in trade relations by according the same (lowest) tariff rates on imports from all countries. If one country reduces tariffs on imports of another country, it has to extend the same reductions to other countries.

The IMF, World Bank, and the GATT became pillars of the global economic system, and, as that system evolved, so did their role. Today, they reflect the interdependence of actors in a globalizing world, reinforce neoliberal norms, and provide global economic governance.

**The International Monetary Fund (IMF)**

The IMF was designed to promote economic stability by regulating monetary policy and currency exchange rates — the price of a country’s currency in terms of other countries’ currencies. It is an intergovernmental organization managed by a board of governors. Day-to-day work is handled by a managing director – customarily nominated by the European Union, an arrangement that is balanced by America’s leading role in selecting the World Bank president.

Stable exchange rates are vital because trade and investment require payment. Countries have different currencies, and the currency of one country cannot be used to buy goods from another. Thus, importers need to convert money into the currency of the countries from which they are purchasing goods. Currency is a commodity like wheat or iron, and its value varies depending on supply and demand. If more people want dollars because they believe the dollar’s value will rise, the demand for dollars will increase, and the dollar’s value relative to other currencies like the euro or yen goes up. The result is a “strong dollar.” But, if the demand for dollars declines, the dollar’s relative value also declines, resulting in a “weak dollar.” When a country’s currency is strong, it can purchase imported goods inexpensively, and imports rise. Since a country’s products are priced in its currency, a strong currency also means that its exports are expensive for foreigners to buy, and exports decline. Thus, countries that want to increase exports may devalue their currency relative to other currencies.

For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, countries adhered to the gold standard, by which the value of all currencies were linked to fixed quantities of gold into which they could be converted. Since currency exchange rates were fixed, exchange rates were stable, thereby facilitating the settlement of trade transactions. After 1933, America abandoned the gold standard in favor of a modified system in which gold coins were no longer used but gold still defined the value of the dollar at a fixed rate of $35 an ounce.

The IMF’s main task was to restore a monetary system based on convertible currencies and fixed exchange rates and prevent competitive devaluations. Fixed exchange rates, however, make the system rigid. With fixed exchange rates in which the value of other currencies was pegged to the US dollar, it was not possible for a country to devalue its currency to increase exports. The IMF was responsible for maintaining stable exchange rates by providing short-term loans to help states manage temporary balance-of-payments deficits.
The IMF’s task grew more complicated and its role expanded with the collapse of part of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. To combat domestic inflation and a spiraling balance-of-payments deficit during the Vietnam War, the Nixon administration decided that the US could no longer afford to subsidize global trade by maintaining a strong dollar. On August 15, 1971, the US announced it would no longer maintain a system of fixed exchange rates and that dollars could no longer be converted to gold.

Several reasons accounted for this decision. First, as monetary interdependence deepened, it became difficult to coordinate so many states’ policies. Transnational banks and corporations had learned how to take advantage of slight fluctuations in interest and currency rates, for example, by buying “cheap” gold and selling dollars in the belief that the US dollar was overvalued, and these practices were beyond IMF control. Second, Europe and Japan had recovered from wartime destruction and wished to reduce their political dependence on America. Washington had previously accepted a trade deficit and an outflow of dollars to help allies recover by providing them with funds to purchase needed imports. By 1971, this was no longer necessary. Third, US spending to wage war in Vietnam and combat poverty at home had stimulated global inflation. US inflation meant that dollars were worth less, but, since adjustment was impossible with fixed exchange rates, that inflation was exported to US allies. Fourth, the Nixon administration wanted to stem the decline in the US trading position but could not do so as long as fixed exchange rates prevented the dollar’s devaluation.

America’s action heralded an era in which currencies were permitted to “float” in relation to one another, their value determined by supply and demand. With some exceptions, floating exchange rates remain the norm. If exchange rates float freely, the currencies of strong economies will rise, while those of weak economies will fall. If a country refuses to let the value of its currency rise freely, however, it will artificially increase its exports and reduce imports, a practice that the US claimed China was following until recently. Currency speculation is inevitable with huge amounts of money racing around the world every day, and maintaining monetary stability – vital for world trade – is a persistent challenge.

IMF funds that are loaned to countries to bolster their currencies are provided by member states, each with a quota based on its economy’s size that is reviewed every five years. The IMF also has a large gold reserve that it can sell for additional funds. As of February 2013, the IMF had available $769.2 billion.25 A country’s quota determines its voting power in the organization. Thus, the world’s richest countries dominate the IMF. The US has 16.59 percent of the votes in the IMF in contrast to tiny Nauru with 0.03 percent. The IMF’s 11 richest members, mostly from North America and Western Europe plus China, Japan, Brazil, and Russia, dominate the organization with 55.07 percent of the votes. A member’s quota also determines how much it may borrow from the IMF in a financial crisis.

As guardian of the world’s monetary system, the IMF monitors economic trends and consults annually with members – “surveillance discussions” – about their monetary policies. The IMF also establishes standards for financial practices to help countries avoid economic crises. Such crises occur owing to large and persistent budget deficits, high external debt burdens, weak or corrupt banking systems, overvalued currency, natural disasters, and domestic violence and wars. Such factors reduce exports, thereby creating balance-of-payments deficits, loss of investor confidence, and panic selling of foreign-owned assets in the country (“capital flight”).
Speculators can undermine a country’s economy overnight by massive sales of its currency, causing its value to collapse.

In a crisis, the value of a country’s currency drops precipitously, and the country loses hard currency, as speculators sell local currency for US dollars, European euros, Japanese yen, or gold. The outflow of hard currency and gold make it impossible for the country to pay its debts, most of which require repayment in hard currency, or to import essentials because sellers refuse payment in local currency. As local currency depreciates, citizens’ savings and pensions are wiped out. Economic activity comes to a standstill, causing massive unemployment and widespread hardship.

The IMF can play a key role in such crises by lending a beleaguered country hard currency to reassure investors. IMF aid, however, has strings attached to it that entail a loss of a country’s control over its economy. Loan recipients must agree to “conditions” that are stated in a Structural Adjustment Program that outlines the economic policies the country must follow to receive loans. The IMF is widely viewed as a surrogate for rich capitalist countries that dominate it and an advocate of those countries’ free-market ideology. Adjustment programs reflect the IMF belief in economic liberalism and privatization. They often require currency devaluation to enhance exports and reduce imports, the balancing of government budgets (by raising taxes and reducing expenditures), lifting government restrictions on imports, exports, and private investment, and ending state subsidies.

These policies reflect the “Washington Consensus,” a term coined by John Williamson, who declares, “the world over seem to believe that this signifies a set of neoliberal policies that have been imposed on hapless countries by the Washington-based international financial institutions and have led them to crisis and misery.” Economist Joseph Stiglitz criticizes such IMF requirements as “based on the outworn presumption that markets, by themselves, lead to efficient outcomes, failed to allow for desirable government interventions in the market, measures that can guide economic growth and make everyone better off.”

Once the IMF approves a country’s reform program, other countries and foreign banks are likely to reinvest in the country and agree to reschedule its foreign debt – key steps in restoring economic health. Most IMF assistance is made through agreements called Stand-By Arrangements in which loans are extended at market-based interest rates. However, poor countries can obtain low-interest concessional loans. Total IMF loans peaked at $95.8 billion in 2012 owing to the Great Recession and declined to $54.4 billion in mid-2016 following the recession. The IMF also assumed the role of providing the newly energized G-20 with staff support and evaluating how a global tax on financial institutions might be levied.

In 2010, the IMF joined the European Union in providing Greece with $60 billion in loans. Greece confronted the prospect of defaulting on the debts it had amassed in previous years by borrowing to finance annual budget deficits. By that time debt rating agencies such as Standard and Poor’s and Fitch had downgraded Greek government bonds to virtual junk status, and there was a growing risk that a Greek default would cripple, not only Greek banks, but foreign banks, especially in Germany and France, that had made earlier loans to Athens. An additional risk was that investors’ panic over Greece would spread to other indebted European countries. Facing an economic and financial maelstrom that threatened to spread across Europe and cross the Atlantic,
the IMF agreed to provide up to $317 billion to supplement an EU stabilization fund that would be available to rescue other eurozone members with serious debt problems. Thereafter, Ireland and Portugal also requested assistance and like Greece agreed to institute austerity programs. To provide amounts that, as in the Greek case, exceed such countries’ IMF quota, the IMF itself borrowed from other countries, notably, China, Brazil, Russia, and India.

Although the IMF had lessened the severity of the conditions it sets to make loans after its experience during the “Asian contagion” of the late 1990s, conditionality – the conditions it attaches to loans – was much in evidence during the European crisis. To obtain the EU/IMF loans, the Greek government had to pledge dramatic cuts in spending and increases in taxes to reduce its budget deficit from 13.6 percent of gross domestic product to below 3 percent by 2014. In order to cut its budget by $37 billion within three years, Greece agreed to do away with bonus payments and freeze salaries and pensions for government workers for three years, increase sales tax from 19 to 23 percent, raise taxes on fuel, alcohol and tobacco by 10 percent, and raise the average retirement age from 61.4 to 63.5. Greece also pledged to reduce tax evasion and eliminate corruption among tax and customs officials. Owing to its efforts to comply with IMF conditions and concern that Greece might leave the eurozone, the IMF approved additional large-scale loans to Greece in 2012 but recommended that the country be allowed to institute policies designed to encourage growth rather than austerity.

Austerity policies imposed as EU/IMF conditions produced resentment. Lower government spending and higher taxes meant an economic slowdown, accompanied by higher prices and spreading unemployment. Greek workers were furious at ending a system that had guaranteed them lifetime employment and early retirement. National boundaries afforded no protection against economic storms, and globalization had eroded the capacity of Athens to manage domestic economic policy. Angry Greeks, especially public service workers, reacted to these conditions by taking to the streets. Their anger led to the electoral triumph of the left-wing Syriza political party in early 2015 led by Alexis Tsipras who became prime minister on an anti-austerity program. However, despite a referendum that approved his opposition to EU/IMF conditions for a bailout, Tsipras, ultimately capitulated in July to the EU/IMF requirements.

As the Greek case indicates, IMF reform programs may increase poverty and political unrest in countries receiving aid. Declines in government spending increase unemployment, and ending subsidies for staples like bread, rising costs for basic goods, and reduced public services may trigger a popular backlash against a government and the IMF, strain social and political institutions, and threaten political stability. The IMF and lending banks advocate government non-intervention in the economy and reliance on the global market. They regard market stability as more important than a state’s economic autonomy. Countries in crisis have little choice but to accept IMF conditionality because private banks will no longer extend loans and, without IMF aid, default is the only (unpalatable) alternative.

We now turn to the second institution conceived at Bretton Woods, the World Bank. The World Bank, which actually consists of several agencies, is a major source of development assistance for poor countries and increasingly has become an advocate of sustainable development.

*The World Bank*
The World Bank was originally established to fund post-World War Two reconstruction but soon turned to the task of economic development. Like the IMF, the World Bank is an intergovernmental grouping with a board of governors and executive board. The bank’s president is by custom an American and is currently Jim Yong Kim, a Korean-American public health expert who succeeded former Trade Representative and Deputy Secretary of State Undersecretary of State Robert Zoellick.

Funded by members’ contributions and borrowing on global capital markets, the bank makes lending decisions on market principles – loan rates and prospects for repayment. For years, the bank funded large, splashy infrastructure projects such as dams that critics argued provided little help to the poor and ignored environmental consequences. In recent years, however, the bank has focused more on the problems of the poorest countries, has raised additional funds for this effort, and provides borrowers with low interest loans to alleviate poverty and stimulate sustainable economic growth.

In 2014, China established the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank as an alternative to the World Bank with initial projects in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. “China will use the new bank to expand its influence at the expense of America and Japan, Asia’s established powers.” China’s initiative as well as its role in joining other BRICS to fund the New Development Bank reflects its frustration with what the group regard as an insufficient governance role in existing global economic institutions.

The GATT and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), is the third institutional pillar of the economic system. Like the IMF and World Bank, the WTO is responsible for a specific aspect of global economics, in this case world trade. In this role, it, too, promotes a neoliberal economic agenda, and it is a leading institutional exponent of globalization.

*The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO)*

Global prosperity depends on people’s ability to sell their products to one another. At Bretton Woods, the GATT was negotiated to encourage a liberal trading order based on the most-favored-nation norm. The GATT was an agreement or treaty, but unlike the IMF or World Bank, it was not an international organization.

Over the years, a series of successful “negotiating rounds” were conducted within the GATT framework to encourage free trade. In the decades following the GATT’s establishment, world trade quintupled and average industrial tariffs fell to one-tenth their 1948 level. The early Dillon (1960–61) and Kennedy (1964–67) rounds reduced trade and nontariff barriers in key industrial sectors, and the Tokyo Round (1973–79) achieved deep tariff cuts and launched efforts to confront controversial issues such as favorable trade treatment for poor countries.

The Bretton Woods institutions were established by economic liberals who believed that eliminating trade impediments would produce greater overall wealth. This belief has been borne out by the experience of the global economy since World War Two. Since the war, industrial tariffs have dropped to less than 5 percent in industrial countries, while global economic growth averaged 5 percent a year and world trade grew at an average of 8 percent a year between 1945 and 1980.
The Uruguay Round (1986–94) was more ambitious than its predecessors, addressing vexing issues such as agricultural subsidies, trade in services like insurance, rules for governing intellectual property. In the end, agricultural subsidies were cut (though not as much as originally hoped), protection for intellectual property was expanded, rules for investment and trade in services were set, and tariffs were slashed by an average of one-third. But the Uruguay Round’s most important accomplishment was establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 1, 1995. Since then, the WTO has become a symbol of economic globalization and a target for anti-globalization groups.

The WTO is intended to provide “the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its members.”36 It is based on norms of non-discrimination in trade, reciprocity of access to markets, lower trade barriers, stability of trade relations, and elimination of unfair trade practices such as government export subsidies or “dumping” (selling below cost to capture a market). These norms and rules are codified in a series of treaties. The GATT regulates trade in goods. The other treaties, as their names suggest – General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and Dispute Settlement agreement – regulate trade in services, protect intellectual property, and create a dispute settlement mechanism to adjudicate trade conflicts that arise among WTO members.

Unlike the GATT, the WTO has teeth that help it enforce trade rules. It is empowered to resolve trade disputes promptly, and its decisions stand unless all members oppose them. GATT decisions, by contrast, could be blocked by any member. Under the WTO agreement, each member agrees that its laws and practices must measure up to WTO rules and, in doing so, surrenders some of its economic sovereignty. Those rules limit states’ unilateral efforts to protect their industries. The United States, for example, tries to stop foreign firms from selling goods in the US at prices below the cost of production. Such dumping is described as an unfair trade practice under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. American firms frequently petition the government to use Section 301 against foreign competitors. Although WTO rules do not bar Section 301, they allow the WTO to determine whether it is being used as a genuine response to dumping or as a way to protect home industries.

Trade disputes are brought before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. The WTO first tries to settle disputes amicably. If consultations are held, they frequently produce efforts to have the dispute mediated. If consultations fail, the Dispute Settlement Body may establish a formal panel composed of independent experts, who must reach a decision within six months. Once a decision is reached, the panel indicates the steps a country must take to end its violation of WTO rules. The loser may appeal to a standing WTO Appellate Body whose decision is final. If a country fails to comply, the state that brought the complaint may ask for compensation or impose retaliatory trade sanctions.

American opponents of the WTO were concerned that this commitment would undermine US sovereignty and weaken US environmental and health regulations that by WTO regulations must be “least trade restrictive.” The WTO can interpret such regulations as efforts to exclude exports of states with less stringent environmental or health standards. Environmentalists argue that LDCs have lax standards and that these should be raised by banning imports from countries that do not provide environmental protection or worker safety. Environmentalists are suspicious about the WTO’s concern for environmental protection because of its decisions, including one in
which it declared illegal the US Marine Mammal Protection Act, which banned tuna imports caught in nets that endanger dolphins. LDCs, however, claim that environmental protests are ruses to keep out their imports and that the costs in improving environmental and safety standards would raise the prices of their products, making them uncompetitive.

The WTO has reviewed a variety of complaints, though trade in agriculture has generated the most disputes. Most have been brought by developed countries against one another or against LDCs, but LDCs also use the WTO to correct what they view as trade injustices by rich states. Between April 2014 and April 2016, 32 cases were brought to the WTO. The EU, America, Russia, and China were targets of over half the complaints. Those brought against the US involved a range of trading partners and issues. India complained about non-immigrant visas, Canada about countervailing duties on paper, Indonesia and South Korea about US anti-dumping measures, and Brazil, Vietnam, South Korea, and the EU about tax subsidies for Boeing. For its part, the US initiated three complaints in the same period – against Indonesia for its licensing requirements for horticultural and animal products and against China about subsidizing domestic industries. Complaints about the EU were brought by Russia (twice), China, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

Let us examine a few celebrated cases to see the kind of disputes that lead countries to ask the WTO for relief. The first involved a complaint against the United States.

THE STEEL CASE In March 2002, President George W. Bush imposed tariffs of 30 percent on a variety of imported steel products to protect the ailing US steel industry from cheap imports and provide political cover for Republican candidates in steel-producing states in upcoming congressional elections. The tariffs affected steel imports from the EU, Brazil, South Korea, and Japan. During the first year of the tariffs, EU steel exports to America plummeted by 37 percent. In July 2003, the WTO ruled against the US, declaring that Washington had failed to show that its steel industry was endangered by foreign imports, and the EU announced it was ready to impose some $2.2 billion in retaliatory duties on US exports – for example, on Florida oranges – carefully selected to cause pain in states critical to President Bush’s 2004 re-election. Following a US appeal, the WTO Appellate Body upheld the ruling, and the Bush administration grudgingly agreed to abide by it.

GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS A second case illustrated the difficulty in distinguishing between efforts to maintain health and safety standards and policies designed to protect domestic industry. Since its inception, the WTO has grappled with the vexing issue of whether national environmental and safety regulations are imposed for legitimate ends or whether they serve as subtle but illegal barriers to trade. GATT Article XX allows countries to impose rules for safety and environmental protection as long as they “are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.”

In May 2003, the US, Canada, and Argentina filed separate complaints to the WTO that a 1998 EU moratorium on the import of genetically modified (GM) food violated trade rules because there was no evidence that such foods were harmful. Under the moratorium, the EU refused to import GM foods until new regulations for labeling and tracing the origins of such foods were in place. Owing to pressures from American farmers and their congressional representatives,
Washington decided to pursue the matter in the WTO even though it threatened to worsen US–European relations already strained by America’s war in Iraq.

Genetically modified food is common in the US and elsewhere because GM crops reduce the need for pesticides and herbicides while providing products with features that consumers find appealing. Most US soybeans and cotton and much of its corn are grown from genetically modified seeds. Many Europeans, however, denouncing what they call “Frankenfood” and claiming that GM food is potentially dangerous to health and biodiversity, have tried to keep it off the market and have US food imports clearly labeled if they contain more than 1 percent GM foods. American farmers and producers of GM seeds, like Monsanto, lobbied vigorously for action to pry open European markets, arguing that labeling is expensive and unfairly implies that there is something unsafe about a product. In 2006, a WTO panel declared that the EU had illegally banned some GM products. In December 2006, the EU announced that it intended to implement the WTO decision but needed additional time to do so owing to the complexity and sensitivity of the issue. Canada agreed to extend the time limit. On July 15, 2009, Canada and the EU announced a mutually agreed solution involving establishment of a dialog on agricultural biotech market access. Argentina accepted this in 2010, and the three complainants agreed to delay imposing punitive tariffs on EU exports.

No global trade round has been completed since 1994. A new round was initiated at a WTO conference in Doha, Qatar in 2001. There, it was agreed that negotiations would focus on freeing trade in agriculture and services, both contentious trade issues, with an eye toward reaching agreement by 2005. However, agreement, which requires consensus in the WTO, has been elusive owing to conflict over reducing agricultural subsidies in the developed world to enable LDCs to sell their products overseas. Efforts to reach agreement collapsed after America and the EU failed to agree over subsidies and developing countries like Brazil refused to reduce tariffs further until Western markets were opened to agricultural goods. A renewed effort to reach agreement in 2008 failed when the US, India, and China could not agree about how to protect farmers in the LDCs from cheap agricultural imports if agricultural tariffs were reduced. Although a deal was reached at a meeting in Bali, Indonesia in 2013 and reaffirmed a year later to facilitate exports from poor countries, observers remain pessimistic about the future of the Doha round. Instead, trading states have sought to establish large regional trading groups, notably the Trans-Pacific Partnership (signed by 12 Pacific-rim countries in 2016) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

_Hegemonic stability theory_

According to hegemonic stability theory, the global economy and the institutions that sustain it require the support of a powerful state to prevent countries from pursuing selfish economic interests. This theory, which is rooted in realism, contends that only a hegemon can promote and enforce the rules of the global trade and monetary systems. In doing so, it both benefits itself and provides a global collective good. The economic order can survive only so long as the hegemon, whether Britain in the nineteenth century or America today, believes that the system is in its interest and sustains it by providing leadership. When no hegemon is willing to provide financial resources during economic crises or political support for international economic institutions, the rules that govern the economic order may be widely flouted. Then, as in the 1930s, states may follow their narrow economic self-interest with beggar-thy-neighbor policies.
Hegemonic stability theory became prominent in the 1980s when it appeared that America was entering a period of economic decline and that Japan might overtake the US as an economic superpower. However, Japan’s anemic economic growth and the surging US economy in the 1990s silenced those who feared the end of US hegemony. More recently, the growth in protectionist sentiment in America and “rising” China have rekindled fears for the future of the liberal economic order.

Will America abandon the global economic order it helped construct or stay the course and support that order? Economic issues, more than other foreign policy questions, are embedded in domestic politics, and economic policies are routinely made in response to domestic interest groups rather than global needs. Were the US to surrender its leading role in fostering cooperation, international economic institutions would be hard pressed to maintain the open trading system established at Bretton Woods. The possibility of US withdrawal does not mean that the existing system is in imminent danger. Most countries recognize that their prosperity depends on cooperation. However, bad times, as in the 1930s, strain global economic cooperation and encourage economic nationalism.

As important to the global economy as the major international economic organizations are the giant transnational corporations that have proliferated in recent decades.
Part 4 Regional international organizations

We now turn to regional organizations, some of which have become major actors. The European Union (EU) is the most complex and advanced of these institutions, and we examine its evolution and Europe’s political integration. We then briefly examine several other regional organizations in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe.

1 The European Union (EU)

The most far-reaching experiment in regional organization is the EU. Even Stephen Krasner, a realist who believes that the sovereign state remains as dominant today as in the past, admits that the EU is something different. “The European Union,” he writes, “offers another example of an alternative bundle of characteristics: it has territory, recognition, control, national authority, extranational authority, and supranational authority.” He continues: “There is no commonly accepted term for the European Union. Is it a state, a commonwealth, a dominion, a confederation of states, a federation of states?” Krasner concludes that the EU is unique and that it “is not a model other parts of the world can imitate.”

Labels aside: to what extent is the EU more than the sum of its member states? Liberals argue that over time European governments have surrendered bits and pieces of their sovereignty to the EU. The group is a complex hybrid polity in which authority is shared among EU bureaucrats, historic nation-states, large provincial regions, and even cities. States are penetrated by European influences through law, regulations, bureaucratic contacts, political exchange, and the appointment of national politicians to community positions. In turn, the domestic politics of member states affect the community as a whole. In Europe, declared three observers, “the state has become too big for the little things and too small for the big things.”

The story of European integration began at the end of World War Two, when Europe’s leaders concluded that, after three major wars in less than a century, the time had come to build an edifice to prevent a fourth. The story, however, is not over. EU unity is beset by several critical strains.

FROM THE END OF WORLD WAR TWO TO THE SCHUMAN PLAN

Following World War Two, America sought to revive Europe’s economy as part of an effort to restart global economic activity, renew Europe as a market for American goods, and reduce the attraction of communism there. To create an environment in which reconstruction could take place, the US adopted a two-prong strategy. The first, providing Europe with the means to rebuild, began with the Marshall Plan. The second, to strengthen European security, culminated in the 1949 formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both prongs sought a united Western Europe as a counterweight to the USSR.

The Marshall Plan offered economic assistance, subject to European coordination of the relief effort – a first step on the road toward European unity. In 1948, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established to coordinate Marshall Aid. Until the European Economic Community was established, the OEEC played an important role in encouraging trade and providing Europe with currency convertibility. Despite the OEEC, Europe’s aid request was little more than a list of individual country requests rather than an effort at broader cooperation. Nevertheless, the key role of West Germany on the Cold War’s front line assured continued US
interest in European integration. A European entity, it was thought, would make the new Germany part of something larger than itself, thereby assuaging fears of other Europeans about a resurgence of German nationalism while allowing Germany to contribute to Europe’s reconstruction and security.

Western Europe’s industrial potential depended on the Ruhr Basin, site of Europe’s largest coal and steel production. Placing this region under international control would force former enemies France and West Germany to cooperate. The first step toward European integration was largely the work of a French economist and former League of Nations official, Jean Monnet. “There will be no peace in Europe,” Monnet declared in 1943, “if States re-establish themselves on the basis of national sovereignty, with all that this implies by way of prestige policies and economic protectionism.” On May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, in a speech prepared by Monnet, proposed integrating the French and German coal and steel industries under a supranational institution called the High Authority. Joined by Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, the Schuman Plan became the basis for the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

THE CONTINUING PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION The ECSC sparked enthusiasm for additional European integration. In 1954 the foreign ministers of the six ECSC members met in Messina, Sicily to examine other ways to advance their integration. The process was given an additional push by the 1956 Suez War, which persuaded French leaders that France could no longer act unilaterally. The result was the 1957 Treaty of Rome that established the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) to pool resources for the peaceful use of atomic energy and the European Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market. The Common Market eliminated all tariffs on trade among members and created a common external tariff. It also entailed common policies in agriculture and transportation and the free movement of people among member states. The Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), enacted to provide Europe’s politically powerful farmers with a guaranteed income by maintaining price supports, became a European institution, an obstacle to free trade in agriculture, and a drain on Europe’s financial resources. Community decisions, made by a Council of Ministers but carried out by a High Commission responsible to the community as a whole, required only a majority, as members renounced their right to block decisions unilaterally.

Great Britain initially refused to join, fearing the loss of sovereign independence, and, instead, sponsored a loose free-trade group called the European Free Trade Association. Although Britain changed its view in 1961, its efforts to join the Common Market were twice vetoed by France’s President Charles de Gaulle, and Britain, Ireland, and Denmark only became members in 1973.

The next step was the 1967 Merger Treaty under which the institutions of the ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM were merged into the European Community (EC). By 1968, all tariffs among members had been eliminated, and the following year agreement was reached on a scheme for financing the EC budget by member contributions. In 1979, the first direct elections were held for a European Parliament. Thereafter, Greece (1981), Portugal (1986), and Spain (1986) joined the group. The EC’s enlargement led to the creation of the European Regional Development Fund under which wealthier members provided development aid to poorer members.
The signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 was another step toward surrendering national sovereignty. It involved some 300 rules for removing impediments to the formation of a single internal economic market and required members to harmonize policies and standards in areas such as tax, health, safety, labor, and environmental policy.

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was a more ambitious step, formally creating the European Union. Europe was given a new structure that consisted of “three pillars”. The European Community remained the EU’s core but with the addition of a second pillar involving cooperation in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a third in Justice and Home Affairs. The CFSP tries to foster a common European position on global issues. Although progress has been made in formulating common foreign policies, efforts to establish a common policy on European defense outside of NATO have largely foundered despite the formation of a Common Security and Defense Policy in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and a commitment to build an all-European rapid-reaction force to deal with sudden crises without US assistance. Standing above and coordinating the activities of the three pillars is the European Council where national leaders meet and bargain. Administration is in the hands of the European Commission with commissioners in charge of specific administrative departments.

The Maastricht Treaty also began a process of transforming the EU into a single Economic and Monetary Union by linking members’ national currencies and committing members to a single European currency. The year 2000 saw the introduction of a new “eurozone” with the replacement by EU members of national currencies by a single currency, the euro, and the establishment of a European Central Bank responsible for monetary policy for the EU as a whole. Although Britain, Sweden, and Denmark opted out from the decision, the countries that joined the eurozone accepted stringent requirements (called the Stability and Growth Pact), including limits on domestic inflation, budget deficits, and long-term interest rates. Since then, the euro has become a major reserve currency and a rival to the US dollar in international transactions.

Another major development was the EU’s eastward expansion. In 2004, ten more states were admitted to the EU: Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Malta, and Cyprus. In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined, and preliminary negotiations have begun regarding the admission of Iceland, Serbia, Turkey, and several smaller Balkan states. To be admitted a state must have a stable market economy and democratic institutions, the latter being a problem for Turkey.

Expansion has, however, complicated efforts to harmonize members’ foreign policies. Several new members, notably Poland, supported American intervention in Iraq despite German and French opposition. Nevertheless, cooperation was evident in economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran in 2011 and against Russia in 2014. Europe now has the equivalent of a foreign minister. EU policemen began serving in Bosnia in 2003, and EU soldiers were deployed some months later in Macedonia to reduce the risk of civil strife there. The EU has undertaken several peacekeeping missions, for example, along the border between Ukraine and Transdniestria, a region that seceded from Moldova. In addition, the EU endorsed the NATO mission in Afghanistan and joined the P-5 in negotiating a deal that prevents Iran from developing nuclear weapons in return for an end to sanctions.
Since expansion, the EU, with a population that exceeds that of the United States by almost 200 million and a larger gross domestic product, has become a force to reckon with in global politics. However, despite advances toward integration, Monnet’s vision of a “United States of Europe” remains elusive. In some respects the EU has become greater than the sum of its parts, an institution that represents the interests of Europeans rather than those of states. Member states, however, still retain considerable sovereign independence, a fact evident during the financial crisis that threatened first Greece and then Spain, Ireland, and Portugal with sovereign default. Only after intense debate and disagreement and with the crisis spreading to global markets did eurozone members agree to establish several funds of up to $950 billion to be loaned or guaranteed by them and the IMF in the event of a threatened default. Such aid would only be extended if countries receiving the assistance agreed to strict austerity that would reduce their deficits. Thus, Greece introduced painful cuts to public-sector pay and pensions, raising the country’s retirement age, increasing taxes, and cutting public investment.

In an effort to form a more perfect union, the EU began a process to draw up a constitution for Europe as a whole.

A EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION The EU embarked on its most ambitious project to date when, at a December 2001 summit in Laeken, Belgium, leaders adopted a declaration of principles as the basis for a continental constitution. As a result of the Laeken Declaration, the European Council established a Convention on the Future of Europe to draft a constitution that was completed by July 2003. Although the treaty was signed in 2004, its rejection the following year by French and Dutch voters halted the process. Instead, in order to avoid additional referendums, the Lisbon Treaty that was signed in December 2007, amending earlier treaties, adopted key features of the abortive constitution. It came into force two years later after being ratified by all EU members.

The Lisbon Treaty was a complex compromise. The treaty added federalist principles to the EU while preserving state sovereignty. Among those features adopted from the failed constitution were a President of the European Council, which represents the governments of member states, and a new post of High Representative, which united the jobs of the foreign affairs and the external affairs commissioners. It was also agreed that a commissioner from each of the member states would serve on the European Commission, that a redistribution of voting weights among member states would be phased in after 2014, that new powers be granted to the European Commission, European Parliament and European Court of Justice, especially in the spheres of justice and home affairs, and that both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers approve most legislation (“co-decision”). Finally, national vetoes were eliminated in several areas such as energy security. Unanimity would still be required in the areas of tax, foreign policy, defense and social security.

In 2009, British Baroness Catherine Ashton was chosen as the first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Belgium’s Herman Van Rompuy as first President of the European Council. The president chairs EU summits, while the country holding the rotating six-month EU presidency will still chair most ministerial meetings. These two EU leaders – currently, High Representative Frederica Mogherini of Italy and Poland’s Donald Tusk as president of the Council – have to work with the President of the European Commission, which has been the executive branch of the EU since its inception.
EUROPEAN (DIS)UNION? Recent years, however, have witnessed growing fissures in the EU, some of which reflect its expansion. Eastern European members, for example, are deeply concerned about Russian intervention in Ukraine that began in 2014 and press the EU to take stronger measures than Western members wish and oppose accepting the flood of Muslim migrants fleeing the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. Northern members, especially Germany, want southern members like Greece to pursue austerity policies to achieve balanced budgets.

The most disturbing evidence of EU disunion, however, was the British decision in a referendum in June 2016 to be the first country to “leave” the EU in accordance with Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. The referendum scheduled by Prime Minister David Cameron to bolster his standing in his Conservative Party proved a disastrous gamble and caused Cameron’s resignation. The referendum divided England and Scotland and prompted anti-European political parties in other member states such as the Netherlands and France to call for similar referendums. “At stake is the breakup, pure and simple, of the union,” declared French Prime Minister Manuel Valls. “Now is the time to invent another Europe.”

Some view “Brexit” as not merely a European issue but an event with global repercussions. Thus, it could divide the West, an objective of Russian President Putin since the expansion of the EU and NATO and Western economic sanctions against Russia following the latter’s annexation of the Ukrainian region of Crimea. “Vladimir Putin will be rubbing his hands in glee,” concluded one observer. “The unhappy English have delivered a body blow to the West, and the ideals of international cooperation, liberal order and open societies to which England in the past contributed so much.”

In sum, the EU is a novel regional organization in which all members surrendered some sovereignty but about which growing numbers of citizens have doubts and in which nationalist sentiments are rising. Moreover, Europe’s unique history creates doubts as to whether the EU is a model for regional integration elsewhere. Nevertheless, regional IGOs have been established on every continent.

2 Other regional organizations

Regional IGOs exist on all continents, and virtually every country is a member of at least one such organization. The first prominent African regional organization was the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963, but was ineffective and in 2002 was succeeded by the African Union (AU). With a Pan-African parliament, a commission, a court of justice, and a development bank, the AU seeks to emulate the EU. The AU’s first peacekeeping mission was to Burundi in 2003 to supervise a ceasefire agreement between warring Hutus and Tutsis. In recent years, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), consisting of 15 West African countries and dominated by its largest member, Nigeria, has reinforced the AU. Founded in 1975 to promote economic development, ECOWAS has also become involved in peacekeeping. Currently, the AU and/or ECOWAS have peacekeepers deployed in Somalia, the western Sudanese region of Darfur, South Sudan, and Mali. The most successful African economic group, however, is the five-member East African Community (EAC) whose members agreed to form a customs union in 2005, have since increased trade with one another dramatically, and seek to create a common currency by 2024.
The regional organization for the Middle East is the League of Arab States (LAS). This IGO is made up of 22 mainly Arabic speaking countries and includes Palestine. The Arab League was founded in 1945 to advance Arab unity, but it has become better known for its disunity. During the Cold War, members divided over superpower allegiances, and in 1976 Egypt’s membership was suspended for over a decade following its peace agreement with Israel. Often, the Arab League has been unsuccessful in defining common positions on such issues as an Israeli–Palestinian peace process and the 2003 Iraq War, but it did request a no-fly zone for Libya in 2011 to stop Muammar Gaddafi from attacking his own people. It remains unclear how the political transformations across the region will affect this organization.

Politically, the most important regional IGO in the Americas is the Organization of American States (OAS). Founded in 1948, the OAS included all 35 countries in the western hemisphere. Communist Cuba was excluded since 1962, and, despite the normalization of US-Cuban relations in 2016, Cuban President Raúl Castro refused to rejoin the group because of its criticism of Venezuela’s authoritarian regime. Occasionally, the OAS has tried to balance the influence of the “Colossus of the North,” while at other times it has supported US policy – for example, in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The most important ambitious economic group in the Americas, however, is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The project began with the 1989 US–Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which became NAFTA when Mexico joined in 1992. NAFTA, which went into effect in 1994, created a free-trade area and a mechanism for deciding trade disputes among members. By 2008 virtually all duties and quantitative restrictions among the three countries had been eliminated. Hailed by business sectors for stimulating trade, generating jobs, and reducing prices, it was opposed by US labor unions that feared the loss of jobs to poorly paid Mexicans and by environmentalists who believed that firms would move to Mexico to avoid US environmental requirements. Today, NAFTA’s biggest critic is the Trump administration, which views it as responsible for job losses and slow economic growth and, therefore, has sought its renegotiation.

NAFTA has benefited all three members. Mexico’s northern region along the US border has become a manufacturing and assembly center for all of North America. Canada and Mexico are America’s two largest export markets, and supports more than 3 million US jobs. Politically, NAFTA reflects North American interdependence and has encouraged Mexico to pursue greater democratization and confront the issues of narcotics and illegal immigration. NAFTA’s effects have not all been beneficial. Employment has increased, but primarily in the low-wage maquiladora industries and workers have been displaced from the agricultural sector. Southern regions of Mexico were especially hard hit by growing economic inequality, a factor that fostered rebellion by the 1994 Zapatista Army of National Liberation in Chiapas. The Zapatistas called NAFTA a “death sentence” for eliminating constitutionally guaranteed collective property rights and heralding the collapse of the local market for maize.

The most ambitious, but as yet unrealized, free-trade project in the Americas is the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The idea was first broached at a summit of 34 regional leaders in Miami in late 1994. There, states agreed to launch a continental free-trade area with authority to resolve regional trade disputes. At a 1998 meeting in Costa Rica, participants agreed to general principles for the free-trade area. Since then, the project has lost much of its momentum owing to differences over the scope and speed of negotiations and opposition from several Latin American states, especially Venezuela under its flamboyant anti-American president, Hugo
Chávez. Dissatisfaction with the process led Venezuela and Cuba to establish in 2006 the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), a socialist regional grouping that in addition to cutting tariffs among member states encouraged regional cooperation to eliminate illiteracy, reduce unemployment, and provide support to prop up poor countries. Today this group has eight members but has significantly weakened owing to the death of Chávez in 2013 and the erosion of the political popularity of the leftist leaders of key member states – Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, Bolivia’s Evo Morales, and Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro.

Asia also hosts several regional IGOs. The most successful is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967. ASEAN conducts regular meetings to discuss regional issues and has signed a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with other states in the region including China. ASEAN members have agreed to speed up economic integration, with a free-trade area in place by 2020.

Another less ambitious but larger Asian group is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) discussion forum. With US backing, the leaders of 15 Pacific Rim countries met in Seattle in 1993 and called for the elimination of impediments to trade and investment among them. Since then six additional countries have joined, including China and Russia. Its meetings have called for action to develop human capital (2015) and renewable energy supplies (2014).

Two other highly ambitious trade groups are under consideration, though the prospects for both appear grim in Donald Trump’s administration. One the Trans-Pacific Partnership, signed in February 2016 in Auckland, New Zealand by 12 Pacific Rim countries (and was viewed by NAFTA governments as improving upon that agreement’s shortcomings), and the question of whether the US Senate should ratify it was a heated topic during America’s 2016 presidential campaign. Once in office, Trump formally withdrew the US from the TPP, opening the way for competing agreements (favored by Russia and China) to be completed, possibly without America’s involvement. The other, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which would create a US–EU free-trade area, was still under negotiation, but its future also was uncertain by the end of 2016.

The European Union is not Europe’s only important regional organization. NATO remains the world’s most powerful military alliance. It was an unprecedented peacetime alliance with a permanent secretariat and a military headquarters that, until the Cold War’s ended, represented America’s commitment to deter Soviet aggression. Under Article 5 of the treaty, members affirmed that they would regard an attack on one of the allies as an attack on all. Because the USSR never invaded Western Europe, Article 5 was never invoked until September 12, 2001 on behalf of the US the day after terrorists attacked New York and Washington.

Since the Cold War’s end, NATO has grappled with how to remain relevant. One way it has done so was by expanding eastward to Russia’s borders to spread stability and democracy across Central and Eastern Europe. In 1990, the former East Germany became part of NATO, and in 1999 the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary were admitted. Five years later Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were added. Although a NATO–Russia Council was created for joint decision-making on several issues such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation, Moscow claims NATO expansion endangers its security, and Moscow’s
intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea have led to efforts to beef up NATO forces after years of relative neglect.

NATO also undertook several out-of-area tasks, intervening in Kosovo, in 1999 and in Libya in 2011. It also provided troops between 2003 and 2014 to pacify Afghanistan, where it remains involved in a non-combat role.68

Another useful European organization is the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**. The OSCE, originally called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), evolved as a forum for reducing East–West tensions during the Cold War. It is recalled for the discussions it hosted in Helsinki, Finland between 1973 and 1975 that led to US–Soviet agreements to acknowledge human rights and recognize Europe’s frontiers, including the boundary between West and East Germany. In 1990, the CSCE’s members signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe that officially recognized the Cold War’s end, and in 1994 the organization changed its name to the OSCE. The OSCE is the world’s largest regional security group with tasks including promoting confidence-building measures among adversaries, pressing for human rights, managing potential crises, and encouraging democratization.

**Conclusion**

Here we have examined the several international organizations and there role in global politics. In the absence of a central authority, international institutions along with international law manage violence and regulate interactions both to protect sovereignty and ensure a stable and orderly global system. It has been also shown that the United Nations and various regional IGOS also mitigate conflict and facilitate economic, military, and political cooperation among participating states.
Section III Test for assessment

Type: multiple-choice

Subject: “World integration processes and international organizations: theories and applied analysis”.

01) 'Hyperglobalists' argue that globalization is bringing about the demise of the sovereign nation-state.
   a. True   b. False

02) 'Globalism' and 'globalization' are really just two words that mean the same thing.
   a. True   b. False

03) 'World government' is a more fanciful idea than 'global governance'.
   a. True   b. False

04) Sceptics of globalization believe that state power, nationalism, and territorial boundaries are of increased, not decreased, importance in world politics.
   a. True   b. False

05) 'Transnational civil society' means ‘… the degree to which networks or patterns of social interaction are formally constituted as organizations with specific purposes.’
   a. True   b. False

06) The 2008 financial crisis can be used to highlight:
   a. the decreasing interconnectedness of international politics
   b. the irrelevance of the idea of globalization.
   c. the idea that with globalization power increasingly is organised and exercised at a distance from those it affects.
   d. the irrelevance of financial institutions in international politics.

07) Which of the following factors is not considered an 'engine' of globalization?
   a. Economics   b. Environment   c. Technics (technology)   d. Politics

08) Which key concept of global politics describes ‘… the rightful entitlement to exclusive, unqualified, and supreme rule within a delimited territory?’
   a. Sovereignty   b. The disaggregated state   c. Independence   d. 'Might is right'

09) Which term best describes “the collective structures and processes by which ‘interests are articulated and aggregated, decisions are made, values allocated and policies conducted through international or transnational political processes’”?
   a. Cosmopolitan   b. global politics   c. raison d’état   d. global polity

10) The Treaty of Westphalia was signed in:

11) Globalization:
   a. is uneven.   b. varies in its intensity and extensity between different spheres of activity.
   c. reconstructs the world as a shared social space.   d. all of the above.

12) Globalization can be seen within the military sphere by:
a. the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
b. the growth of transnational terrorism.
c. the growing significance of transnational military corporations.
d. all of the above.

13) The three pillars of the Westphalian Constitution of world politics are:
a. life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.   b. independence, autonomy, sovereignty.
c. territoriality, sovereignty, autonomy.   d. sovereignty, territoriality, independence.

14) Political globalization involves webs of:
a. non-state actors and corporations.   b. alliance politics.   c. civil society.
d. multilateral institutions, policy networks, and transgovernmental cooperation.

15) What two terms best describe the transition to a post-Westphalian order of global politics?
a. International relations to global politics  
b. (State centric) geopolitics to (geocentric) global politics  
c. Internationalization to globalization  
d. Cold war to post-cold war

16) The most important aspect of the NATO alliance was the American commitment to the defence of Western Europe.
a. True  b. False

17) The European Security and Defence Policy began in which year?

18) What year was the NATO treaty signed?
a. 1945  b. 1949  c. 1952  d. 1960

19) Which treaty in 1968 sought to limit the spread of nuclear weapons?
a. SALT 1  
b. Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty  
c. ABM Treaty  
d. START 1

20) What regional organization emerged in East Asia in 1967?
a. ASEAN  b. NATO  c. The UN  d. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

21) 'International society' is the merging of distinct political communities into one.
a. True  
b. False

22) The caliphate and the papacy are examples of transnational authority.
a. True  
b. False

23) What was the primary organ of the Idealist inter-war order?
a. The League of Nations  
b. The United Nations  
c. The Concert of Europe  
d. The hegemonic influence of the US
24) What does OPEC stand for?
   a. Overly Populated Economies and Countries
   b. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
   c. Old People with Economic Concerns
   d. Oil and Petroleum Economies with Coal

25) What international institution was not part of the Bretton Woods system at its inception?
   a. The International Monetary Fund (IMF).
   b. The IBRD.
   c. The GATT.
   d. The United Nations.

26) In 1995 the GATT became __________.
   a. the G8.
   b. the New International Economic Order (NIEO).
   c. the World Trade Organization (WTO).
   d. the International Trade Court.

27) Which approach states that institutions ‘... reinforce particular patterns of interaction and reflect new ones’? 
   a. Realism
   b. Constructivism
   c. Institutionalism
   d. Globalism

28) The Bretton Woods system was originally designed to prevent another Great Depression and advance the economic interests of the United States.
   a. True
   b. False

29) International institutions can exist without organizations, but not vice versa.
   a. True
   b. False

30) Non-governmental actors are becoming increasingly important in the development and codification of international legal norms.
   a. True
   b. False

31) The United Nations Charter makes reference only to state rights.
   a. True
   b. False

32) The UN Charter specifically outlines the role of peacekeeping in the international system.
   a. True
   b. False

33) The UN Charter essentially re-affirmed the principle of sovereignty.
   a. True
   b. False
34) Promoting development is an important UN goal in itself  
   a. True  
   b. False  

35) How many states signed the UN Charter when it was first established in 1945?  
   a. 39  
   b. 51  
   c. 191  
   d. 72  

36) Which nation is not a member of the permanent five who hold a veto on the Security Council?  
   a. The United States  
   b. China  
   c. Germany  
   d. France  

37) The __________ serves as the main UN judicial organ to settle disputes between states?  
   a. International Criminal Court (ICC)  
   b. International Court of Justice (ICJ)  
   c. Security Council  
   d. Peacekeeping Operations and Missions  

38) Which body is not a principal organ of the United Nations system?  
   a. World Bank  
   b. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)  
   c. Trusteeship Council  
   d. International Court of Justice  

39) Amnesty International is an example of what kind of transnational actor?  
   a. Transnational company (TNC)  
   b. International non-governmental organization (INGO)  
   c. Intergovernmental organization (IGO)  
   d. Non-governmental organization (NGO)  

40) The European Union can trace its origins to the Paris Treaty of 1951-52.  
   a. True  
   b. False  

41) The EU is the only place in the world so far where integration has gone beyond a regional organization.  
   a. True  
   b. False  

42) Supranationalism implies the creation of common institutions having independent decision-making authority.  
   a. True  
   b. False
43) Most of the activity of the European Union takes place in:
   a. London.
   b. The Hague.
   c. Brussels.
   d. Paris

44) What treaty embodied the critical turning point for the European Union by establishing full economic and monetary union as well as substantial political union?
   a. Rome Treaties, 1957
   b. Maastricht Treaty, 1992
   c. Nice Treaty, 2000
   d. Constitutional Treaty, 2004

45) ASEAN agreed in 2003 to form:
   a. a security community, an economic community, and a socio-cultural community.
   b. a regional institution.
   c. a socio-cultural and an economic community.
   d. an alliance.

46) What does the OAU (now the AU) stand for?
   a. Organization of Asian Unity
   b. Organization of the American Unity
   c. Organization of African Unity
   d. Organization of Australian Unity

47) The WTO has how many members as of early 2010?
   a. 100
   b. 53
   c. 153
   d. 253

48) In what year was the World Trade Organization (WTO) inaugurated?
   a. 1948
   b. 1983
   c. 1987
   d. 1995
Section IV Essay topics/Exam Questions

1. Definitions and different concepts of international organizations
2. Typology and classification of international organizations
3. Role and place of international organizations in modern international relations and multilateral diplomacy
4. Evolution of the idea of an international organization in political science
5. Prototypes of international organizations and their appearance *ad litteram*
6. Genesis of international organizations and their evolution with regard to changing geopolitical and economic reality
7. International organization in the Realist and Liberalist paradigms of international relations
8. International organization in the Neomarxist and Constructivist paradigms of international relations
9. Prerequisites of UN establishment and its brief history
10. UN Charter: overview and key points
11. UN principal organs: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Secretariat, International Court of Justice, United Nations Trusteeship Council
12. UN System Agencies
13. Main objectives of the UN: peacekeeping and security, promoting human rights, sustaining economic development and humanitarian assistance, supplementary tasks
14. Negotiations within the UN
15. Estimations of UN capacities and its potential as mediator, peacekeeper and the world’s chief intergovernmental organization
16. New challenges and role of the UN in contemporary crises management
17. International Monetary Fund
18. International Labour Organization
21. Participation of Russia in the World Bank Group structures
26. Brief history of the WTO: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, rounds and negotiations, founding, Marrakech agreement
27. Principles of the WTO trading system, functions and organizational structure;
28. Dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO
29. Russia’s accession and participation at the WTO
30. OECD: brief history, objectives, activities, organizational structure, membership
31. BIS: brief history, objectives, activities, organizational structure, membership
32. Regional banks of development
33. Typology and variety of sectoral and regional economic organizations and multilateral cooperation frameworks
34. Hybrid system of supranational and intergovernmental decision-making in the European Union
35. Key institutions of the European Union
36. Institutional framework of the Eurasian Economic Union, its executive bodies
37. Institutional frameworks of integration groups: North American Free Trade Agreement, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
38. Variety, typology and classification of non-governmental international organizations
39. Professional training of an international organization civil servant: competences, knowledge, soft skills
40. Working conditions and careers prospects in different international organizations
Section V Literature and resources

**Basic literature:**

**Supplementary literature:**


**Internet resources:**

1) 22nd Annual Asia International Coffee Conference. Coffee Outlook.
   http://www.asiainternationalcoffee.com/

2) A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System.


33) OECD Data. https://data.oecd.org/
47) UN Job Finder. http://unjobfinder.org/
53) Universal Postal Union. http://www.upu.int/